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PAYMENTS DATA SECURITY BREACHES AND 
OIL SPILLS: WHAT LESSONS CAN PAYMENTS 
SECURITY LEARN FROM THE LAWS 
GOVERNING REMEDIATION OF THE EXXON 
VALDEZ, DEEPWATER HORIZON, AND 
OTHER OIL SPILLS? 
Sarah Jane Hughes 
Legal regimes for remediating defects and certain accidents range from 
strict liability in tort to warranty enforcement litigation to international 
treaties and conventions with explicit, pre-ordained compensation limits 
and procedures. Although to date no over-arching legal regime has 
governed data security defects and breaches in the United States or 
elsewhere, data security breaches are as capable of inflicting externalities 
on counter-parties and consumers as the types of defects and accidents that 
are covered by such schemes.1 
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 1. See Chris J. Hoofnagle, Internalizing Identity Theft, 13 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 2, 29–34 
(2009). 
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When I began thinking about a paper for this Symposium, I was struck 
by the similarities and differences between data security breaches and 
maritime accidents, at least in terms of their substantial consequential and 
incidental damages. In payments data security, these damages include card 
cancellation and replacement expenses, database clean-up expenses, 
counter-party and customer business relation expenses, reputational injuries 
(including loss of customers and market capitalization to business counter-
parties), and the risk of identity theft, damage to credit ratings, lost credit 
opportunities, and emotional distress to card or account holders.2 In the 
maritime and exploration industries, these damages include damage to the 
environment, shore and sea life, and livelihoods.3 
In particular, I began wondering about whether pollution and sea-
worthiness analogies might exist between famous payments data security 
breaches—that Professors Edward Janger, one of our hosts, and Paul 
Schwartz, a faculty alumnus of Brooklyn Law School, called “data 
spills”4—such as TJX,5 Hannaford Brothers,6 and Heartland Payments, 
Inc.,7 and famous maritime accidents such as the Torrey Canyon wreck,8 the 
Exxon Valdez grounding,9 and the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion.10 This 
line of inquiry also led me to the 1973 and 1978 international conventions 
that were drafted in response to Torrey Canyon,11 and to ponder whether the 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See United States v. Karro, 257 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing the human cost of 
identity theft, including emotional costs). 
 3. See Joe Stephens, The Valdez’s Unheeded Lessons; BP was Part of Alaska Response, but 
Decades Later Same Problems Persist, WASH. POST, July 14, 2010, at A1. 
 4. See generally Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security 
Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913 (2007). 
 5. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Agency Announces Settlement of Separate 
Actions Against Retailer TJX, and Data Brokers Reed Elsevier and Seisint for Failing to Provide 
Adequate Security for Consumers’ Data (Mar. 27, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/03/data 
sec.shtm [hereinafter Settlement of Separate Actions]. 
 6. See In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D. 
Me. 2009). 
 7. See Linda McGlasson, Heartland, Visa Announce $60 Million Settlement Funds Would 
Reimburse Card Issuers for Breach-Related Losses, BANKINFOSECURITY (Jan. 8, 2010), 
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/articles.php?art_id=2054. 
 8. See In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The Torrey Canyon, 
an oil tanker carrying more than 119,000 tons of oil from the Persian Gulf to Wales, was stranded 
on the rocks off the southwestern coast of England, causing the Torrey Canyon’s oil tanks to 
rupture and discharge oil into the Atlantic, polluting both shorelines of the English Channel. See 
id. at 229. The British Royal Air Force eventually bombed the Torrey Canyon, destroying the ship 
and leading to a total loss of its cargo. Id. 
 9. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). The Exxon Valdez, a 
“supertanker” carrying 53 million gallons of oil from Alaska to the lower 48 states, “grounded on 
Bligh Reef off the Alaskan coast,” causing the discharge of millions of gallons of crude oil into 
Prince William Sound after the ship’s hull fractured. Id. at 2611–13. 
 10. See Campbell Robertson, 11 Remain Missing After Oil Rig Explodes Off Louisiana; 17 are 
Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2010, at A13. 
 11. See Background on Pollution Prevention and MARPOL 73/78, INTERNATIONAL 
MARITIME ORGANIZATION, http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/ 
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core teachings of those conventions might help frame approaches for data 
security breach prevention, clean-up, and liability. 
Just as Professor Juliet M. Moringiello’s Article for this Symposium 
harks back to property law and common law warranties to suggest an 
approach for more contemporary payments data security breaches,12 I 
recognize that data spills are newer phenomena than maritime accidents and 
oil spills. Thus, in searching for approaches to these problems, I, too, 
looked backwards—but to different sources of law. However, like accidents 
involving discharges of oil and other pollutants at sea, such as Exxon 
Valdez, and incidents involving problems with oil and gas exploration, such 
as Deepwater Horizon, data security breach remediation may require the 
development of laws, treaties, and conventions to govern these types of 
accidents. 
Of course, at the March 19, 2010 Symposium at Brooklyn Law School, 
we had no idea that only a month later one of the most devastating oil spills 
in U.S. history would occur. The events surrounding the April 20, 2010 
explosion on the BP Deepwater Horizon oil drilling platform in the Gulf of 
Mexico will be featured prominently in our discussions of energy policy, 
environmental policy, and general disaster management for decades,13 just 
as the data security breaches at TJX, RBS WorldPay, and Heartland will in 
future discussions of data security policy. 
The WellPoint data breach—disclosed in June, 201014—and Hannaford 
highlight additional concerns with payments data risk management and data 
governance that had not been the focus of the Symposium draft of this 
Article. These concerns include a lack of coordinated rapid-fire response 
capacities and delays in sharing information about breaches with affected 
constituencies—including merchant banks and customers—that need it 
most.15 Similarly, Deepwater Horizon confirmed that we still lacked 
sufficient rapid-fire disaster relief capability for natural disasters than was 
evident following Hurricane Katrina or Exxon Valdez.16 In both data and 
natural disasters, we depend on private risk determinations pre- and post-
accidents and largely private efforts to manage critical pieces of the 
recovery processes. The incentives of the companies that bear the largest 
                                                                                                                 
OilPollution/Pages/Background.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2010); see also International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, concluded Nov. 2, 1973, 1340 
U.N.T.S 184, 12 I.L.M. 1319, 1340, as modified by Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, concluded Feb. 17, 1978, 1340 
U.N.T.S 61, 17 I.L.M. 146 [hereinafter MARPOL 73/78]. 
 12. Juliet Moringiello, Warranting Data Security, 5 BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & COMM. L. 63 
(2010). 
 13. See Stephens, supra note 3. 
 14. See Steve Ragan, WellPoint: Data Breach Caused by Attorneys and Faulty Security 
Update, TECH. HERALD (June 29, 2010, 6:11 PM), http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/ 
201026/5807/WellPoint-Data-breach-caused-by-attorneys-and-faulty-security-update. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Stephens, supra note 3. 
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responsibility for oil spills are similar to the incentives of private payments 
systems and users that report payments data security breaches to authorities, 
and their nearly exclusive role in remedying the damages to others affected 
by payments data breaches.17 Thus, we are all hostages in a sense to private 
decision-making in the prevention and remediation of certain events and to 
the rigorous cost-cutting that has typified business practice in the United 
States.18 In addition, pending criminal investigations (or even the prospect 
of them) generally delay access to critical information about culpability. It 
often is some time before we can know the full details about accidents—
whether oil spills or shipping mishaps, or data security breaches—and these 
delays themselves may slow the process of crafting appropriate protections 
and remediation schemes for the specific incidents and applying the lessons 
learned from each going forward. 
The totality of ship and drilling accidents—of which, federal records 
suggest, a “handful” occurred in the Gulf of Mexico annually from 1964 to 
2009,19—also sent me thinking beyond the negligent or criminal data 
security breach events that occupied most of my thinking prior to the 
Symposium. Broader transnational crimes, national security threats, and 
disaster management concerns present themselves in the payments data 
arena almost as starkly as in the maritime and environmental accidents 
arena.20 
Much has been written about payments data security breaches and the 
damages they can impose on consumers who are victims.21 Perhaps just as 
much has been written about various state laws and federal proposals that 
require providers to notify consumers when their personally identifiable 
information has been lost.22 The quality of these articles leaves me free to 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See Schwartz & Janger, supra note 4, at 919. 
 18. See Stephens, supra note 3; see also Hoofnagle, supra note 1, at 33. 
 19. Steven Mufson, Since ‘64, A Steady Stream of Oil Spills Has Tainted Gulf, WASH. POST, 
July 24, 2010, at A1. 
 20. In the days following the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks, the Federal Reserve System put 
hundreds of millions of dollars of liquidity into the U.S. banking system in order to keep the 
economy running. James J. McAndrews & Simon M. Potter, Liquidity Effects of the Events of 
September 11, 2001, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV., Nov. 2002, at 59, available 
at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/02v08n2/0211mcan.pdf. The Federal Reserve lent 
billions of dollars through the discount window, more than 200 times the daily average amount of 
lending in the prior month, and temporarily waived daylight overdraft fees and overnight overdraft 
penalties. Id. at 69–70. 
 21. E.g., J. Howard Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or Consequences: Protecting 
Privacy in Commercial Information, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 121–23 (2008); Chris J. Hoofnagle, 
Identity Theft: Making the Known Unknowns Known, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 97, 98 (2007); Joel 
R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877 (2003); Schwartz & 
Janger, supra note 4. 
 22. See, e.g., Janine S. Hiller, David L. Baumer & Wade M. Chumney, Due Diligence on the 
Run: Business Lessons Derived from FTC Actions to Enforce Core Security Principles, 45 IDAHO 
L. REV. 283, 285–88, 305–08 (2009) (discussing international, federal, and state laws regarding 
hacking and privacy, and the application of legal principles to enhance consumer privacy); Bruce 
A. Colbath, Customer Privacy & Data Security: The Importance of Guarding Your Hen-House, 
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pursue other issues here; which, of course, does not suggest that I could 
handle them as well as their authors did. 
But relatively less has been written about the “direct and indirect” 
damages and “opportunity costs” that payments systems participants suffer 
because of data spills.23 These businesses normally are not the targets or 
entry points of data security breaches, but rather sustain forms of collateral 
“pollution” from those data security “spills”24 much like maritime accidents 
pollute physical and environmental assets. These payment systems 
participants include entities upstream from a data security breach, as well as 
others on its periphery.25 To complicate recovery of collateral costs borne in 
these cases, contractual disclaimers for third-party losses dominate in the 
major agreements governing the operation of the credit card systems.26 
They are less common in wire transfer bank-customer agreements because 
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)’s Article 4A regime requires an 
explicit agreement to pay consequential damages and also limits—to the 
extent allowed by Section 4A-305—the opportunity to vary the liability of 
the receiving bank by agreement.27 
Data security in payments takes on a new urgency in light of reports 
about recent mass-scale hackings—including the hacking into Google 
Gmail accounts by the People’s Republic of China28—reports that 
individuals based in China are hacking into commercial databases,29 and 
reports about the increasing scope of criminal hacking episodes.30 The 
                                                                                                                 
60 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 603, 607 (2006) (discussing state statutes enacted in the wake of the 
Choicepoint data breach). 
 23. For an example of specific research addressing these issues, see PONEMON INSTITUTE, 
2008 ANNUAL STUDY: COST OF A DATA BREACH (2009), available at 
http://www.encryptionreports.com/download/Ponemon_COB_2008_US_090201.pdf. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See VISA, RULES FOR VISA MERCHANTS: CARD ACCEPTANCE AND CHARGEBACK 
MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES 60 (2007), available at http://www.emscard.com/uploads/Documents 
/rules_for_visa_merchants.pdf. 
 27. U.C.C. § 4A-305 (2001). Of course, UCC Article 4A also sets forth a series of rules that 
are designed to allow the receiving bank to identify erroneous payment orders by reliance on 
specific arrangements in the security procedure agreed to by the sender and its receiving bank. 
E.g., id. § 4A-205 (2001). The sender also has a duty to discover and report errors in orders 
accepted by the receiving bank. Id. § 4A-205(b). In addition, in connection with a claim for 
liability for late or improper execution or failure to execute payment orders, § 4A-305(a) of the 
U.C.C. limits damages to those payable under subsections (a) and (b). Other damages, including 
consequential damages, are recoverable to the extent provided in an express written agreement of 
the receiving bank. Id. § 4A-305(c)–(d). 
 28. See, e.g., A New Approach to China, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010, 3:00 
PM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html. 
 29. Mike Harvey, China Raid on Google ‘Also Hit Global Industrial Targets’; Hackers 
Installed ‘Back Door’ to Gain Control of Computers, TIMES (UK), Jan. 16, 2010, at 15. 
 30. Id. In contrast, the combined number of data security breaches reported by government and 
military agencies in the United States fell in 2009 compared with 2008, but the number of records 
affected was larger. Hilton Collins, Many More Government Records Compromised in 2009 than 
Year Ago, Report Claims, GOV’T TECH. (Dec. 2, 2009), 
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cross-border aspects of such breaches add to this urgency,31 particularly 
because they make business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-consumer 
(B2C) compensation more complicated.32 Additional concerns emerge from 
the prospect of strategic hacking incidents, including the lack of apparent 
well-coordinated disaster response and management capacity, and the 
continued reliance on private actors to prevent, report, and respond to data 
security breaches.33 
We also must confront the fact that many cyber-breaches are never 
publicized to persons whose information may have spilled or to law 
enforcement.34 In some cases, even incidents that are publicized in news 
media may not be revealed with particularity to customers. For example, 
following Heartland, my family received new credit cards in the mail with 
new account numbers and no explanation whatsoever from the card issuers 
of why they suddenly were replacing cards that had not expired. In early 
2010, I received a new set of American Express cards bearing the same 
expiration date also with no explanation; concerned, I called the company 
and learned that the replacements were part of its private remediation of a 
former employee’s theft of hard drives containing many thousands of 
cardholders’ personal information that had been detected nine months prior. 
Apparently to reassure me, the company’s representative told me that the 
perpetrator was now cooperating with the recovery efforts and that my 
account data had only recently been identified as having been affected by 
the theft. 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.govtech.com/gt/articles/734214 (discussing a report by the Identity Theft Resource 
Center that the number of breaches reported up to December 2009 was 82 compared with 110 for 
all of 2008 but that the number of records affected soared from less than three million to more 
than 79 million). The report apparently called for greater vigilance in securing data, including 
“when it’s mobile.” Id. The article also cited 461 separate data breaches in “all sectors” affecting 
222 million records, as opposed to a total of 656 breaches in 2008 that affected “more than 35 
million compromised records.” Id. 
 31. William Resnik et al., Wave of Online Banking Fraud Targeting Businesses, K&L GATES 
NEWSSTAND (Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.klgates.com/newsstand/detail.aspx?publication=6209 
(explaining the growing theft and misuse of user names and passwords to online banking accounts 
and use of fraudulent wire transfers and automated clearing house (ACH) transfers to foreign 
countries). 
 32. See id. The terms “B2B” and “B2C” refer, respectively, to business-to-business and 
business-to-consumer transactions in e-commerce and e-payments. See, e.g., Jane K. Winn, 
Consumers and Standard Setting in Electronic Payments Regulation, 5 ELEC. BANKING L. & 
COM. REP. 11, 15 (2002); Robert Kossick, The Internet in Latin America: New Opportunities, 
Developments, & Challenges, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2001). 
 33. See Ellen Nakashima, War Game Reveals U.S. Lacks Cyber-Crisis Skills; Staged 
Emergency Displays Need for Strategy, Organizers Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2010, at A3 
(covering the February 2010 “Cyber Shock Wave” simulation conducted in Washington, D.C.). 
 34. See Diane Bartz & Jim Finkle, Cyber Breaches Are a Closely Kept Secret, REUTERS, Nov. 
24, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5AN4YH20091124  (detailing the 
reluctance of companies that are victims of breaches to disclose them because of fear of 
reputational damage, loss of customers, injury to profits, and criminal attention shifting to smaller 
and medium-sized firms whose data is less well protected). 
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Finally, in a reminder that seemingly ordinary burglaries may cause 
massive expenses and potential liability, on March 1, 2010, a report 
emerged about an October 2, 2009 burglary of fifty-seven hard drives from 
a closet at a BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee training facility.35 These 
hard drives apparently contained unencrypted data from more than one 
million customer support calls and 300,000 “screen shots” of computer 
monitors made contemporaneously with the support calls; most of the calls 
and many screen shots revealed sensitive personal information that is used 
in identity theft, according to the report.36 
The Ponemon Institute’s annual report on data breach costs suggests 
that the overwhelming percentage of breaches is attributable to negligence 
by insiders.37 Negligence in the handling of sensitive personal information 
in transmission or storage is not dissimilar from the captain’s absence from 
the bridge as the Exxon Valdez approached the reefs in Prince William 
Sound, Alaska with an inebriated harbor pilot at the controls,38 or the series 
of “risk-based decisions” that BP apparently made in the management of 
the drilling process at the Deepwater Horizon facility and for which 
government investigators tentatively concluded that the operators chose the 
“least expensive option even though it potentially elevated the risk.”39 So, 
in the prevention of oil spills, one commentator observed the lessons we 
ought to have learned from the grounding of the Exxon Valdez went 
“unheeded” too long.40 The same may be said of data spills because of the 
slow pace of U.S. card security to adopt Europay, MasterCard, and Visa 
(EVM) security, and this may involve risk assessments that opt for less 
expensive technologies over those that offer greater security for data.41 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Robert McMillan, Data Theft Creates Notification Nightmare for BlueCross, PCWORLD 
(Mar. 1, 2010, 5:30 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/190461/data_theft_ 
creates_notification_nightmare_for_bluecross.html [hereinafter McMillan, Data Theft]. 
 36. Id. (detailing more than five months of work including notification of more than 300,000 
customers so far and expenses of more than $7 million). 
 37. PONEMON INSTITUTE, supra note 23, at 7. 
 38. See Stephens, supra note 3. For more detailed information about the Exxon Valdez 
grounding, oil spill, and its causes, see ALASKA OIL SPILL COMMISSION, SPILL: THE WRECK OF 
THE EXXON VALDEZ, IMPLICATIONS FOR SAFE TRANSPORT OF OIL (1990), available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/oil-spill/docs/alaska-commission-report.pdf. 
 39. Joel Achenbach & David Hilzenrath, From Series of Missteps to Calamity in the Gulf; 
Investigators Believe that BP Cut Corners, WASH. POST, July 25, 2010, at A1. 
 40. Stephens, supra note 3 (reporting on BP predecessor British Petroleum’s “central role” in 
the Exxon Valdez incident and pointing a finger at cost-cutting to maximize profits and regulators 
“too close to the oil industry” that “approved woefully inadequate accident response and cleanup 
plans”). Stephens also described comments made by the Chairman of the former Alaska Oil Spill 
Commission, Walt Parker, including “‘[i]t’s almost as though we had never written the report [on 
the Exxon Valdez].’” Id. 
 41. Kate Fitzgerald, Fraud Could Come from North After Canada Phases in EMV, AM. 
BANKER, July 14, 2010, at 6 (citing a prediction by Christopher Justice, the president for North 
America of the French payment terminal maker Ingenico S.A., that “‘fraudsters specializing in 
magnetic stripes will begin to focus more heavily on the U.S. as Canada moves away from mag-
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This Article suggests sources of law for an institutional framework that 
would create stronger incentives for the prevention of payments data 
breaches and for their prompt remediation, including a requirement for 
compulsory notice to a central agency regardless of the number of 
individuals or records involved. It does not advocate compulsory notice to 
consumers whose rights may be affected by a cyber-security breach, and 
instead recommends that the central agency—whether domestic or 
international—decide whether notifying consumers whose accounts might 
be affected is warranted. The Article also considers whether our current 
means of redressing losses through payments system rules and litigation is 
preferable to possible federal schemes like the oil liability provisions of the 
Clean Water Act,42 and the liability provisions of the Oil Pollution Act 
(OPA) of 1990.43 The former established strict liability civil penalties and 
significantly higher civil penalties for cases involving gross negligence.44 
The latter establishes a liability framework that increases incentives for 
prevention by limiting damages to removal costs and maximum damages 
unless the oil spill incident was caused by the gross negligence or willful 
misconduct of the responsible party or the failure or refusal of the 
responsible party or its counter-parties to report the incident.45 If the 
liability limits are too low, the tendency will be either to devote too few 
resources to prevention, or to fail to report or underreport the severity of the 
spill, as may have happened in Deepwater Horizon.46 Incomplete or delayed 
notice requirements in the data spills hinder remediation and may contribute 
to broader complications, including threats to larger payments systems and 
critical infrastructure. Reporting delays or incomplete reporting would 
particularly complicate the remediation of malicious attacks or strategic 
behavior designed to cripple part or all of the domestic payments systems. 
Part I of this Article briefly describes what government agencies, think 
tanks, and the media have reported about recent high-profile data spills 
affecting payments systems, and particularly the prospects of large-scale 
criminal and even strategic cyber-security threats.47 Part II describes the 
                                                                                                                 
stripe’” and also that converting “back-office and software . . . to switch from mag-stripe card 
would cost billions” as an explanation of the slower pace of EMV adoption here). 
 42. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1321 (2006). 
 43. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2702, 2704 (2006). 
 44. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1321(7)(A) (strict liability civil penalty), with 33 U.S.C. § 1321 
(7)(D) (significantly higher civil penalty for cases involving gross negligence). However, neither 
penalty was sufficiently large to deter the cost-cutting and low-balled risk assessments that 
allegedly led to the Deepwater Horizon explosion. 
 45. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (maximum liability and removal costs for offshore 
facilities is “the total of all removal costs plus $75,000,000”), with 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1)–(2) (the 
prior limit is inapplicable if the incident is proximately caused by gross negligence or willful 
misconduct, or involves a violation of a federal safety, construction, or operating regulation, or if 
the responsible party does not report the incident). 
 46. See Mufson, supra note 19. 
 47. See Nakashima, supra note 33. 
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origins of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, 
collectively known as MARPOL 73/78,48 in major pollution events 
associated with maritime accidents and particularly the Convention’s 
requirements for the prevention of pollution. It also describes the federal 
Clean Water Act, which prescribes rules for spills from pipelines as well as 
oil wells,49 and the OPA, which prescribes special rules for off-shore 
facilities and deepwater ports spill liability.50 Part III compares the 
requirements and remedies that MARPOL and the OPA offer with those 
available for the prevention of data security breaches. Part IV evaluates 
recently passed and introduced bills focused on data security breaches and 
cyber-security problems generally. It also briefly discusses recent state 
legislation relating to data security breaches. Part V asks whether “safe 
harbor” provisions in legislation might result in reduced prevention and less 
effective care to recover from data spills rather than more. Part VI sets forth 
conclusions. 
I. PAYMENTS DATA SECURITY BREACHES/DATA SPILLS 
Like maritime or oil exploration accidents discharging oil or other 
pollutants, data security breaches come in many sizes.51 However, unlike 
the provisions of the OPA that specifically allow removal costs incurred in 
connection with oil spills into the navigable waters, adjoining waters, or the 
exclusive economic zone of the United States,52 there is no comparable 
federal liability scheme for data spills. Accordingly, prevention plans and 
remediation efforts have largely been left to private actors in the data spill 
arena.53 For example, the federal “Safeguards Rule” implementing Section 
501 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) Privacy provisions,54 and the 
Disposal and Red Flags Rules implementing the Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA)55 that apply to providers of consumer 
financial products and services, reflect legislative and regulatory 
preferences for self-assessments of risks and for implementation by private 
                                                                                                                 
 48. MARPOL 73/78, supra note 11. 
 49. 33 U.S.C. § 1321. 
 50. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2006). 
 51. Mark Jewell, TJX Breach Could Top 94 Million Accounts, MSNBC.COM, Oct. 24, 2007, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21454847. 
 52. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a)–(b)(1). 
 53. See, e.g., Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 36,484, 36,484 
(May 23, 2002) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 314). 
 54. See Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R. § 314 (2010). § 501 
privacy provisions that are the underlying authority for the Safeguards Rule are codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2006). 
 55. Duties Regarding the Detection, Prevention, and Mitigation of Identity Theft, 16 C.F.R. § 
681.2 (2006); Disposal of Consumer Report Information and Records, 16 C.F.R. § 682 (2006). 
See also Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 
Stat. 1952 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681). 
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actors of policies and procedures that match these self-assessments.56 State 
laws also leave to private actors the ability to own or license personal 
information about their customers, and implement and maintain “reasonable 
security procedures and practices,” but require these procedures and 
practices to be “appropriate to the nature of the information” to protect it 
from “access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.”57 Thus, 
incentives exist for low-balling risk in order to reduce the costs associated 
with prevention of data security breaches, just as it appears that low-balled 
or ignored risks contributed to the well explosion and subsequent inability 
to control the oil spill from the Deepwater Horizon well.58 
The next portion of this Article examines recent data spills and their 
remediation costs. These examples reflect different types of spills—some 
negligent and some presumptively criminal or malicious—and their effects 
in terms of unauthorized access to account information or loss of funds by 
some affected parties. 
A. RECENT SPILLS INVOLVING PAYMENTS DATA 
Four recent examples suggest that substantial damages may result from 
payments data breaches. These examples represent different problems that 
payments systems participants have with data security, including B2B 
liability and B2C liability, as well as qualifications to participate in 
payment systems. 
1. WellPoint 
WellPoint, Inc. (WellPoint) is the nation’s largest health insurer with a 
customer base of more than 30 million.59 It apparently experienced a data 
breach in October 2009, as the result of a failed security update.60 WellPoint 
reports that the breach “could have exposed personal information,” 
including medical history and payment information, “belonging to 470,000 
customers.”61 WellPoint did not learn about the breach until it received a 
subpoena the following March.62 The company attributed some 
unauthorized access to manipulation by attorneys representing an applicant 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See, e.g., Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 67 Fed. Reg. at 36,484 (final 
rule requires financial institutions to develop written information security programs appropriate to 
the size and complexity of their operation, the nature and scope of activities in which they engage, 
and the sensitivity of the customer information they obtain, and also that “certain basis elements” 
be included to “ensure that it addresses the relevant aspects of the financial institution’s operations 
and that it keeps pace with developments that may have a material impact on its safeguards”). 
 57. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(b) (Deering 2009). 
 58. Achenbach & Hilzenrath, supra note 39. 
 59. See Ragan, supra note 14. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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for insurance.63 It had notified 470,000 customers—including 230,000 in 
California alone—by June 29, 2010, and had undertaken other remediation 
measures. WellPoint continued to access its options for the recovery of its 
expenses and data as it remains unclear precisely who or how many 
unauthorized persons gained access to the records.64 
2. Royal Bank of Scotland 
Data spills affecting the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) are a reminder 
that not all payments data spills target U.S. providers or consumers in the 
U.S. RBS has had more than one payments data security breach. In 2008, 
the company—along with American Express and UK-based NatWest 
Bank—lost data contained on a server that was sold on eBay for the 
equivalent of $64; the server apparently contained unencrypted back-up 
data “includ[ing] names, addresses, bank account numbers, telephone 
numbers and customer signatures.”65 
On November 8, 2008, RBS WorldPay experienced widespread fraud 
as a result of another data breach.66 The data breach had occurred earlier 
when unauthorized individuals accessed the information.67 This time, RBS 
lost $9 million when thieves used ATMs in forty-nine cities around the 
world to gain the cash after penetrating RBS WorldPay servers.68 After 
stealing encrypted data from payroll cards and the associated PINs, some 
members of the group also allegedly accessed the RBS WorldPay network 
and raised the applicable limits on the cards as well as limits on what could 
be withdrawn at ATMs with the cards.69 Following that breach, Visa 
stripped RBS of its status as a validated service provider, but by May 22, 
2009, it had restored RBS’ status as a Payment Card Industry Data Security 
Standard (PCI DSS) validated service provider.70 
3. Helsinki, Finland Merchant 
A second case concerning a non-U.S. owner of data involved a 
Helsinki, Finland merchant who reported that data from more than 100,000 
payment cards had been stolen from the merchant’s server; of these, 40,000 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Tom Espiner, Amex, Royal Bank of Scotland, NatWest Customer Details Sold on eBay, 
CNET NEWS (Aug. 26, 2008, 10:57 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-10026032-83.html. 
 66. Robert Lemos, Data-Breach Lawsuit Follows $9 Million Heist, SECURITYFOCUS (Feb. 6, 
2009), http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/903. 
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 68. Id. 
 69. RBS WorldPay Indictment Outlines Sophisticated Hacker Coordination, DIGITAL 
TRANSACTIONS (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.digitaltransactions.net/index.php/news/story/2371. 
 70. Warwick Ashford, RBS WorldPay Regains Security Approval After Data Breach, 
COMPUTERWEEKLY (May 22, 2009, 9:25 AM), http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2009/ 
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were active cards.71 The Helsinki Criminal Police’s Information 
Technology Crimes Unit reported that: (a) the attacks on the merchant’s 
servers were traced to internet protocol addresses in Romania and the 
United States although they were uncertain that the attacks originated in 
either country; (b) the data breach occurred in mid-January, but involved 
payment cards from 2005 to January 2010—as many as three-fifths of 
which may have expired; (c) a routine computer security check uncovered 
the breach; and (d) the merchant has removed the vulnerable system from 
use and has replaced it with the newer-age, less vulnerable EMV system.72 
The merchant had decided to notify only those domestic and foreign 
cardholders whose cards have been fraudulently used.73 Finland’s largest 
credit card services company, Luottokunta, noted that because Finnish 
merchants use the PCI DSS, advanced monitoring, and card shutdown 
systems, the level of payment card abuses was “half” the rate experienced 
in other countries.74 
4. P2P File Sharing (Unnamed Victims or Potential Victims). 
A fourth type of data spill apparently involves person-to-person (P2P) 
file sharing at almost 100 organizations, as reported by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) in February 2010. The details about these data spills are 
vague, but the FTC’s press release makes it clear that file sharing software 
enabled the transmission of personally identifiable and account information 
otherwise available on the computer on which the file-sharing programs 
were run.75 
B. WHAT DO PAYMENTS DATA SPILLS COST? 
As the above data security breaches suggest, reported costs for data 
security breaches have risen over the past few years. For example, the 2008 
Annual Study: Cost of a Data Breach, issued in February 2009, reported 
that “total annual costs” incurred in seventeen different industries rose to 
“$202 per record compromised [in 2008], an increase of 2.5 percent since 
2007 ($197 per record) and 11 percent [since] 2006 ($182 per record).”76 
The same study reported that the largest cost increase involved “abnormal 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Marcus Hoy, Data Security: Payment Card Data Theft from Merchant is Finland’s 
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 72. Id. An EMV system is a specialty security platform that Europay, MasterCard, and VISA 
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 75. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Widespread Data Breaches Uncovered by FTC Probe 
(Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/02/p2palert.shtm. 
 76. PONEMON INSTITUTE, supra note 23, at 4. 
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churn,” which indicates customer turnover.77 The report also noted that 
healthcare and financial services companies that experienced data breaches 
had the highest churn (customer defections) factors of 6.5 and 5.5 percent, 
respectively, which the report attributed to both the sensitivity of the data 
collected and customer expectations that information will be protected.78 
Other factors in the overall costs of data spills identified in the 
Ponemon Institute report include “outlays for detection, escalation, 
notification, and after the fact (ex-post) response.”79 Companies that 
experience data security breaches—like those that experience oil spills—
also suffer declines in their market capitalizations that can be significant.80 
Evidence suggests that payments-related data spills cost an average of more 
than $6.6 million.81 TJX reported losses of more than $1 billion in 
connection with its 2006 breach,82 and direct remediation expenses of $256 
million.83And, in addition, companies that suffer payments data spills often 
experience significant declines in their capitalization in the period following 
report of the breach.84 
These significant declines in capitalization appear to be in addition to 
the direct remediation costs reported above and costs associated with 
enforcement actions and instituting and maintaining compliance plans. FTC 
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Expenses, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 15, 2007, at A1. 
 84. PONEMON INSTITUTE, supra note 23, at 4. 
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enforcement actions involving violations of its financial privacy and 
safeguards rules, or pursuant to its unfair or deceptive practices authority, 
have required—in various combinations—civil penalties, consumer redress 
payments, implementation of comprehensive data security programs, and 
implementation of independent audits of compliance.85 For example, 
ChoicePoint, Inc. (ChoicePoint) paid $10 million in civil penalties and $5 
million in consumer redress to settle the FTC’s charges in 2006.86 In a May 
2005 filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, BJ’s estimated 
that these claims were worth approximately $13 million.87 ChoicePoint also 
was involved in a second enforcement action in 2009, for violations of its 
2006 consent order.88 At the time BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. settled the 
FTC’s charges, banks and credit unions were pursuing BJ’s to recover for 
fraudulent payments and for damages associated with the cancellation and 
re-issuance of credit and debit cards.89 The FTC consent order against 
CardSystems Solutions—a third-party payment service provider charged 
with violations of FTC Act Section 5’s unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
authority—provides a good example of its requirements for new 
comprehensive data security programs to protect the security, 
confidentiality, and integrity of personal information that it collects or 
receives from consumers by adopting administrative, technical, and 
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security, see Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacy 
initiatives/promises_enf.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). For an example of an FTC settlement 
requiring implementation of a comprehensive information security program and long-term 
independent audits, see Settlement of Separate Actions, supra note 5. 
 86. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, ChoicePoint Settles Data Security Breach Charges; To 
Pay $10 Million in Civil Penalties, $5 Million for Consumer Redress (Jan. 26, 2006), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.shtm. The violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
included failure to employ reasonable procedures to screen prospective clients for its specialized 
credit reporting services and eventual disclosures of the personally identifiable information 
pertaining to more than 160,000 customers when the clients to whom disclosures were made had 
applications that raised red flags, including using commercial mail drops as business addresses, 
using cell phone numbers as business telephone contact numbers, and paying for services using 
money orders drawn on multiple issuers. See Complaint for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction, 
and Other Equitable Relief at 5, 7, United States v. Choicepoint, Inc., No. 06-cv-0198 (N.D. Ga. 
Jan. 30, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069complaint.pdf. The 
FTC also charged that ChoicePoint in one case continued to provide consumer information after 
ChoicePoint had suspended the customer for nonpayment on more than one occasion. Id. at 7. 
 87. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, BJ’s Wholesale Club Settles FTC Charges (June 16, 
2005), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/06/bjwholesale.shtm [hereinafter BJ’s Wholesale Club Press 
Release]. 
 88. See Supplemental Stipulated Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary 
Relief, United States v. ChoicePoint, Inc., No. 06-cv-0198-JTC (N.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 2009), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint.shtm. ChoicePoint also is a recidivist like 
BP. See id. 
 89. See BJ’s Wholesale Club Press Release, supra note 87. For the complaint and consent 
order, see In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465 (2005). 
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physical safeguards for personally identifiable information.90 Of course, 
design and implementation of a new security program is a significant 
expense. 
II. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION GOVERNING NOTICE OF 
AND COMPENSATION FOR MARITIME SPILLS OF OIL AND 
OTHER HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES 
As mentioned above, there may be many parallels drawn between 
payments data spills and pollution from maritime accidents. Both impose 
costs on unsuspecting people that include huge risks of collateral damage to 
livelihoods. Maritime accidents affect fisheries, shipping activities, and the 
welfare of shore life. Businesses affected by data spills may experience a 
fall in share values/market capitalization,91 exclusion from participation in 
payment systems,92 and reputational damage. Individuals may experience 
emotional distress, decreased credit ratings, and a loss of the privilege of 
using credit rather than cash. 
Both types of spills impose costs from long-term remediation efforts. 
Indeed, reports suggest that TJX spent at least $256 million on recovery 
efforts related to its data spill and that its overall losses were $1 billion.93 
Exxon claims to have spent about $2 billion cleaning up the 11-million-
gallon spill from the Exxon Valdez and another $1 billion to settle civil and 
criminal charges against it.94 Consequential damage from the grounding to 
sea life alone included the loss of 250,000 seabirds and more than 20 orca 
whales.95 To compensate victims affected by Deepwater Horizon, BP has 
established a fund in the range of $20 billion96 and spent more than $3 
billion on the early stages of the clean-up and recovery.97 To deal with the 
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consequences of these oil spills many conventions have been concluded. 
Importantly, these conventions serve as useful comparisons for ways to deal 
with data spills. 
MARPOL 73/78 is the short-hand name for one such convention, the 
1973 International Maritime Organization convention and a series of related 
amendments, annexes, and protocols, including the 1978 and 1997 
amendments to the convention.98 MARPOL 73/78 is not the only 
convention dealing with the consequences of maritime collisions or with 
certain forms of hazardous substance releases from sea-going ships.99 There 
is also, for example, the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime 
Claims.100 U.S. laws also govern incidents such as fatalities and oil spills.101 
MARPOL has features that could serve as a template for a regime to 
deal with data spills. It is a document with global force and, therefore, with 
legitimacy, and it relies on governmental mechanisms, non-governmental 
organizations, and—as one of its most attractive features for the purpose of 
addressing data spills provides—its scheme relies on a diverse group called 
“experts” to solve various technical, legal, and political problems that arise 
under its provisions.102 
MARPOL 73/78, the amendments to the 1978 Protocol and subsequent 
regulations implementing the whole scheme, and U.S. laws implementing 
the MARPOL scheme or other environmental protection requirements offer 
four guiding points for a possible framework for payments data spills: (1) 
the requirement of compulsory notice to a central agency;103 (2) a 
compensation scheme that extends to third-parties affected by the hazardous 
substance spills;104 (3) operational restrictions;105 and (4) the requirement to 
outfit sea-going ships with double hulls or other alternative protections, 
such as double bottoms, so as to protect against the accidental release of 
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hazardous substances in the ships.106 A fifth guiding principle of the oil spill 
prevention scheme—the creation of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) as an international organization focused on the 
problem—predated MARPOL.107 
A comprehensive national or international approach to data security 
breaches might even avoid one of the pitfalls that MARPOL and other 
international conventions and U.S. environmental protection statutes share 
in terms of fixed liability limits that prove very hard to update. For 
example, the liability limit in the Clean Water Act was intended to subject 
violators to civil penalties in amounts “up to $25,000 per day of violation or 
an amount up to $1,000 per barrel of oil.”108 
But regardless of these imperfections, the five pivot points found in 
MARPOL, its amendments and IMO regulations as well as U.S. 
environmental protection laws offer some useful approaches for data 
security spills. 
A. COMPULSORY NOTICE OF SPILLS 
One of the most useful analogies that payments data security can draw 
from MARPOL 73/78 is its requirement of compulsory notice of oil spills 
to a central agency.109 There is no de minimus rule in the MARPOL 
scheme; that is, the ship’s operators must report every spill or discharge.110 
In contrast, enacted state legislation and pending federal bills regarding 
data security breaches, discussed infra, only require prompt notice to law 
enforcement if the breach affects a threshold number of individuals or 
records—such as at least 10,000 individuals or a million or more records, 
and separate notices to consumers whose card data has been breached.111 It 
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is this Article’s position that, in order to protect critical infrastructure assets 
and national security, notice between the entity that suffers the breach and a 
central authority (at least at the national level) that a payments data spill has 
occurred should be mandatory regardless of its size, rather than based on 
some threshold. Proprietary payments systems rules and credit and debit 
card master agreements should require the merchants, payments processors, 
or financial institutions whose systems are breached to notify their counter-
parties as well, regardless of the number of records or accounts affected. 
Thresholds, I would argue, keep from central scrutiny data problems at their 
beginning, may allow them to spread, and certainly provide no early-
warning system equivalent of orchestrated attacks on a retailer, payment 
system, or financial institution that would protect everyone involved. 
B. COMPENSATION FOR THIRD-PARTY LOSSES 
MARPOL 73/78 is also part of a longstanding scheme of compensation 
for third-party losses that reaches back to 1954, beginning with the 
convention known as OilPOL.112 Compensation allows affected 
communities and individuals to survive the damage to livelihoods and to 
physical environments on which they depend or around which they live. 
Since OilPOL, various international conventions and domestic laws 
implementing them in some cases have increased the amount of first-level 
compensation.113 
The group of international conventions providing for compensation 
includes two that predate MARPOL 73/78, the 1969 International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (commonly known 
as the 1969 Civil Liability Convention), and the 1971 International 
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (commonly known as the 1971 
Fund Convention), each of which has been replaced by new protocols in 
1992, now known, respectively, as the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and 
the 1992 Fund Convention.114 The 1992 Civil Liability Convention imposes 
                                                                                                                 
 112. OilPOL, supra note 99. The 1978 Protocol to the 1973 Convention essentially replaced 
OilPol. See Background on Pollution Prevention and MARPOL 73/78, supra note 11. However, 
Congress then repealed the Oil Pollution Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-167, 75 Stat. 402, which had 
implemented OilPOL and the Oil Pollution Act Amendments of 1973. Act to Prevent Pollution 
from Ships of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-478, 94 Stat. 2303 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1901–1915). 
 113. U.S. statutes implemented these compensation schemes to include, inter alia, Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1321 (2006), the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 43 U.S.C. § 1814 (1988) (repealed 1990), the 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1653 (1988), and the Deepwater Port Act, 
33 U.S.C. § 1517 (1988). 
 114. The International Regime for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage: Explanatory Note 
Prepared by the Secreteriat of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, INT’L OIL 
POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUNDS (Dec. 2010), http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/genE.pdf 
[hereinafter Explanatory Note]. 
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strict liability on ship owners for oil pollution damage.115 The 1992 Fund 
Convention provides supplementary compensation for oil pollution victims 
if the former convention’s compensation is inadequate.116 In addition, a 
Protocol to the 1992 Fund Convention created a third tier compensation 
prospect through the International Oil Pollution Compensation 
Supplementary Fund, raising the maximum payable for one incident to 
750,000,000 Special Drawing Rights, which is equivalent to 
$147,500,000.117 
Examples of domestic legislation providing for compensation exist in 
the United States and Turkey. In the United States, the OPA specifies the 
types of damages that individuals and other entities that suffered injury 
could obtain from persons responsible for oil spills.118 These include 
damages to natural resources, real or personal property, subsistence uses of 
natural resources, revenues, public services, and profits.119 In addition, it 
specifies the scope of clean-up costs for which responsible persons are 
liable, including containment and actions necessary to “minimize or 
mitigate damage to public health or welfare, including, but not limited to, 
fish, shellfish, wildlife, and public and private property, shorelines, and 
beaches[.]”120 The OPA allows the States to impose liability on responsible 
parties beyond the liability that the Act provides.121 Turkey’s law was 
adopted in 2005.122 
A special scheme for damages to third-parties—like the overall scheme 
supporting compensation for oil-spill victims briefly described above—
might be used to sustain credit reporting blocks or monitoring and recovery 
expenses, particularly when breaches affect smaller merchants or 
institutions, or other sorts of damages that are hard to quantify in advance. 
                                                                                                                 
 115. See id.; see also International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 
1992, art. 1 ¶ 6, art. 3 ¶ 1, opened for signature Jan. 15, 1993, 1956 U.N.T.S. 255, available at 
http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/Conventions%20English.pdf. 
 116. See Explanatory Note, supra note 114; see also International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992, at art. 
II, ¶ 1, opened for signature Jan. 15, 1993, 1953 U.N.T.S. 330, available at 
http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/Conventions%20English.pdf. 
 117. Explanatory Note, supra note 114. To determine the daily value of Special Drawing rights 
under this scheme, see Exchange Rate Archives by Month, INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/param_rms_mth.aspx (last visited Dec. 28, 2010). For a 
comprehensive analysis of the overall oil pollution damages scheme, see MICHAEL MASON, 
TRANSNATIONAL COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: EXAMINING CHANGING 
SPATIALITIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY (2002), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/570/1/RPESA-
no69(2002).pdf. 
 118. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2720, 2731–2738 (2006). 
 119. Id. § 2702(b)(2) 
 120. Id. § 2701(30). 
 121. Id. § 2718(a). 
 122. For a thorough discussion of this law, see MURAT TURAN, TURKEY’S OIL SPILL RESPONSE 
POLICY: INFLUENCES AND IMPLEMENTATION (2009), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ 
nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/turan_0809_turkey.pdf. 
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In establishing a compensation scheme for counter-party and consumer 
damages from data spills, however, we should take care to create a 
mechanism to provide for periodic increases in basis compensation. This 
would avoid the problems associated with compensation schemes in which 
allowed damages have not kept pace with inflation, such as in the Death on 
the High Seas Act of 1920123 or in 13 U.S.C. § 1321(7)(A), which 
establishes a civil penalty for “owner[s], operator[s] or person[s] in charge 
of any vessel, onshore facility or offshore facility from which oil or a 
hazardous substance is discharged in violation of” 13 U.S.C. § 1321(3) that 
is capped at $25,000 per day of violation for discharges of oil or other 
hazardous substances or at up to $1,000 per barrel of oil or unit of 
reportable quantity of hazardous substances discharged.124 In addition, in 
cases in which the violation “was the result of gross negligence or willful 
misconduct” of an owner, operator, or person in charge described in 13 
U.S.C. § 1321(7)(A), the person is “subject to a civil penalty of not less 
than $100,000, and not more than $3,000 per barrel of oil unit of reportable 
quantity of hazardous substance discharged.”125 
In addition, the compensation scheme might reward prompt and 
accurate reporting of the data spill to avoid the obvious temptation to 
lowball the estimate of damages inflicted. In the Deepwater Horizon 
incident, for example, there were many reports that BP was under-reporting 
the discharge from the well so that it could take advantage of the “strict 
liability” penalties in 13 U.S.C. § 1321(7)(A) and avoid the higher penalties 
for “gross negligence” provided in 13 U.S.C. § 1321(7(D).126 
C. OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS 
MARPOL 73/78 imposes additional operational requirements and some 
restrictions on tankers and other vessels that do not meet its mandates. For 
example, just as VISA suspended RBS PayCard’s approved service 
provider status after its breach revealed that its compliance with PCI DSS 
was inadequate,127 vessels that do not meet certain criteria under MARPOL 
may not enter certain waters or ports,128 and may be required to keep 
expanded records and undergo additional inspections.129 
This multi-pronged approach to prevention may be more effective than 
the single-factor reliance on encryption or double-factor encryption and best 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Death on the High Seas Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30302–30308 (2006). 
 124. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(7)(A) (2006). 
 125. Id. § 1321(7)(D). 
 126. John Schwartz, Liability at Issue in Oil Flow Rate in Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Jul 19, 2010, at 
A17; see also Press Release, The Select Committee on Energy, Independence and Global 
Warming, Markey: Flow Rate Report Shines Light on BP’s Financial Liability, True Size of Spill 
(May 27, 2010), http://globalwarming.house.gov/mediacenter/pressreleases_2008?id=0255. 
 127. Ashford, supra note 70. 
 128. Revised Annex I of MARPOL 73/78, supra note 105, at regulations 20–21. 
 129. Revised Annex I of MARPOL 73/78, supra note 105. 
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practices approaches seen in state data security breach laws as well as 
pending federal legislation.130 
D. DOUBLE HULLS AND COMPARABLE SAFE-DESIGN 
REQUIREMENTS 
MARPOL 73/78 also requires specific structural defenses to guard 
against oil spills and other discharges into the sea. For tankers built after 
1981, MARPOL requires that construction be double-hulled.131 The 
convention requires that vessels with large capacities but built before June 
1, 1982 or contracted to be built before that year, be retrofitted with double 
bottoms and structural improvements to their sides.132 Vessels without 
appropriate structural defenses as required by MARPOL should not expect 
access to certain ports.133 Similarly, payments systems participants that 
cannot comply with PCI DSS’s required firewalls and 128-bit encryption 
security features—or that employ EMV/chip-and-PIN technology instead—
might be precluded or suspended from certain payments systems. Such was 
the fate of Heartland after its breach.134 
E. MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND AVOIDANCE OF 
TRADE-HINDERING NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
The fifth lesson that MARPOL 73/78 offers to the solution of payments 
data spills relates to its role as a model for international cooperation in the 
effort to reduce the temptation to deal with certain issues piecemeal through 
national legislation. Because of rising evidence that the perpetrators of data 
security breaches operate internationally,135 and because the threat of 
transnational criminal prosecution may not deter cyber thieves, international 
cooperation through private standard setting and international conventions 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See infra Part IV. 
 131. Revised Annex I of MARPOL 73/78, supra note 105, at regulation 20. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. For an analogous situation regarding data breaches, see Ashford, supra note 70 
(describing how banks may be removed from Visa’s and Mastercard’s list of validated service 
providers if they are not compliant with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard). 
 134. E.g., Freed, supra note 92 (reporting the suspension of the Heartland system from VISA 
participation until it had been recertified); Lemos, supra note 66 (mentioning the use of low-level 
thieves called “cashers” to withdraw funds from ATMs in Montreal, Moscow, Hong Kong, and 
other cities in the U.S. and abroad depleting 100 accounts and revealing personal information on 
1.5 million cardholders and the social security numbers of 1.1 million of them); Robert McMillan, 
FTC Says Scammers Stole Millions, Using Virtual Companies, COMPUTER WORLD, Jun. 27, 2010, 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9178560/FTC_says_scammers_stole_millions_using_vir
tual_companies (scammers used U.S. residents to move money to Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Estonia) 
[hereinafter McMillan, FTC Catches Scammers]. More recently, reports suggest that Russian 
hackers broke into check image depositary and used information to generate counterfeit checks 
and stole $9 million. Elinor Mills, Check Counterfeiting Using Botnets and Money Mules, CNET 
NEWS (July 28, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-200111885-245.html. 
 135. See, e.g., McMillan, FTC Catches Scammers, supra note 134. 
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offers an attractive approach for the prevention and resolution of data 
security incidents. 
III. HOW DO PAYMENTS DATA SPILLS AND MARITIME SPILLS 
COMPARE? 
Part II of this Article focuses on costs associated with the prevention 
and remediation of spills, both payments data and oil-related. This Part 
focuses on the causes of spills. In this regard, payments data spills and 
maritime accidents share things in common. First, both may derive from 
insiders’ negligence or recklessness, or cost-cutting that affects risk-
prevention measures.136 Examples of negligence leading to data spills 
include: 
 Theft of unencrypted information on hard drives stored in an 
apparently unsecure closet in a training facility of BlueCross 
BlueShield of Tennessee. These hard drives contained data, as well 
as photos of the screens on which trainees and operators were 
working that revealed sensitive personally identifiable information 
about customers;137 and 
 The spectacular TJX breach affecting 94 million payment records 
of credit cards and debit cards involving the use of wireless Internet 
transmissions of data vulnerable to interception in a process known 
as “war driving” in which thieves use readers to capture 
transmissions leaving known store locations.138 
Maritime examples include: 
 The disarming of one or more warning systems on the Deepwater 
Horizon oil drilling platform in the days and weeks prior to the 
explosion and spill, and the failure to heed other signals that 
important safety features were not functioning as planned;139 
 The grounding of the Exxon Valdez in the Valdez Inlet near 
Anchorage, Alaska in 1989. Investigation of the cause of the 
accident revealed that, despite the known shoal dangers of Prince 
William Sound through which the Valdez was moving,140 only one 
officer was on the bridge at the time of the accident and that the 
                                                                                                                 
 136. For a discussion on oil spills, see Achenbach & Hilzenrath, supra note 39. 
 137. See McMillan, Data Theft, supra note 35. 
 138. Byron Acohido, Cyberthieves Find Workplace Networks are Easy Pickings; Simple 
Hacking Techniques Have Potential to Collect Data From Any Entity Using a Digital Network, 
USA TODAY, Oct. 9, 2009, at B1 (discussing the TJX and Hannaford data security breaches and 
the means used to intercept data). 
 139. David S. Hilzenrath, Alarm System on Rig Was Disabled, Technician Testifies, WASH. 
POST, July 24, 2010, at A5. 
 140. See ALASKA OIL SPILL COMMISSION, supra note 38. 
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pilot had been under the influence of alcohol at the time of the 
grounding;141 and 
 The Cosco Busan accident that spilled 53,569 gallons of heavy 
crude into San Francisco Bay on November 7, 2007.142 The United 
States filed felony and misdemeanor charges against the Cosco 
Busan’s management and pilot for sailing in fog, travelling at an 
unsafe speed, failing to make plans or use radar, and falsifying 
documents.143 
Second, the sources of spills may be entirely different. For example, the 
1978 wreck of the Amoco Cadiz was caused by the failure of the tanker’s 
steering mechanism and subsequent rough weather, which in turn caused 
the tanker to split apart, spilling 68.4 million gallons of oil and despoiling 
more than 125 miles of the coast of France.144 This tanker was not fitted 
with a double hull—because MARPOL’s requirement was not in effect at 
the time—placing its cargo at greater risk in the event of grounding.145 
Does the grounding of the Exxon Valdez bear a stronger resemblance to 
the BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee spill—which involved unencrypted 
data in an unguarded location—or the Google spill—which involved the 
high-tech penetrations of significant firewalls around wire transfer 
systems?146 
While considering the above, it may be helpful to think about the 
differences between navigating correctly charted waters, on the one hand, 
and navigating areas in which recent storms or sand accretions may affect 
the reliability of the charts. Or, in other words, navigating around known 
rocks is easier because, normally, big rocks do not move often and sand 
does.147 The chart and, therefore, the charted course should be all right if all 
one is interested in is avoiding the rocks. But the same won’t work with 
sand, which is constantly eroding and accreting.148 
                                                                                                                 
 141. Stephens, supra note 3; see also ALASKA OIL SPILL COMMISSION, supra note 38, at 27. 
Among other sea and shore life, the oil spill killed 250,000 sea birds and more than twenty orca 
whales in Prince William Sound, Alaska, alone. Joling & Thiessen supra, note 95. 
 142. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, INCIDENT SPECIFIC 
PREPAREDNESS REVIEW (ISPR) M/V COSCO BUSAN OIL SPILL IN SAN FRANCISCO BAY: REPORT 
ON INITIAL RESPONSE PHASE (2008), available at http://www.uscg.mil/foia/CoscoBuscan/Cosco 
BusanISPRFinalx.pdf (listing number of birds caught (1,039), cleaned (681), and dead (1,365) due 
to the Cosco Butan oil spill and discussing origins of the spill). 
 143. Bob Egelko, Felony Charges for Ship’s Management, S. F. CHRON., July 24, 2008, at B3. 
 144. Allen Tony, MV Amoco Cadiz, THE WRECKSITE ARCHIVE (June 26, 2007), 
http://www.wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx?10339. 
 145. See Background on Pollution Prevention and MARPOL 73/78, supra note 11. 
 146. More E-Mail Account Details Leak Online, N.Y. TIMES GADGETWISE BLOG (Oct. 6, 2009, 
11:05 PM), http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/06/more-e-mail-account-details-leaked-
online/?scp=3&sq=wire%20transfer&st=cse. 
 147. Interview with Roland Trope, Esq., Partner, Trope & Schramm, LLP, in Coral Gables, FL 
(Jan. 25, 2010). 
 148. Examples of accretions and erosion abound. Storms may cause breaches that radically alter 
tidal flows in their vicinities and lesser weather changes may cause significant shifts in sand bars 
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But, as new operating systems are rushed to market, data security 
confronts efforts by cyber-thieves that are analogous to movements of both 
rocks and sand on a constant basis as thieves search for any available 
vulnerability and seek to penetrate systems that may have been considered 
impenetrable just prior to the breach. So, in some respects, detecting and 
preventing risks to data security may be harder than avoiding the 
aforementioned types of shipping accidents. However, the risks to critical 
infrastructures and national security are such that stronger incentives for 
appropriate levels of monitoring and deterrence as well as some legal, 
centralized, or collective solutions are needed. 
IV. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO DATA SPILLS AND 
PROSPECTS—DO PROPOSALS SUFFICIENTLY ADDRESS 
SPILL PREVENTION AND DATA SPILL REMEDIES FOR 
BUSINESSES OR CONSUMERS WHOSE SYSTEMS OR 
PERSONAL INFORMATION IS BREACHED? 
A. CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION 
Notwithstanding the numerous data spills and the damages resulting 
from them, the only recent federal law specifically related to data breach 
notification is the Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health Act of 2009 (HITECH Act).149 The Act expanded the 
enforcement jurisdiction of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA)150 to allow state attorneys to enforce HIPAA’s 
provisions and implementing regulations.151 
                                                                                                                 
and shoals that affect tides or otherwise threaten maritime safety. See, e.g., Nelson Sigelman, 
Three Years Later, Norton Point Breach Marches On, MARTHA’S VINEYARD TIMES, Apr. 29, 
2010, http://www.mvtimes.com/marthas-vineyard/article.php?id=536; Nelson Sigelman, Ocean 
Forces Continue to Shape Katama Cut, MARTHA’S VINEYARD TIMES, June 19, 2008, 
http://www.mvtimes.com/2008/06/19/news/norton-point-breach.php. Studies of sand-bar 
migration include Edith L. Gallagher, Steve Elgar & R.T. Guza, Nearshore Sandbar Migration, 
106 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 11,623 (2001); Edith L. Gallagher, Steve Elgar & R.T. Guza, 
Observations of Sand Bar Evolution on a Natural Beach, 103 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 3203 (1998); 
D.J. Phillips & S.T. Mead, Investigation of a Large Sandbar at Raglan, New Zealand: Project 
Overview and Preliminary Results, 1 REEF J. 267 (2009). 
 149. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
123 Stat. 115, 226 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 150. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 16, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.). 
 151. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act § 13410(e). Using 
this new authority, the State of Connecticut was reported to be investigating the WellPoint data 
breach. See Joseph Goedert, Conn. AG Probes WellPoint Breach, HEALTH DATA MGMT (July 6, 
2010), http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/news/breach-wellpoint-anthem-connecticut-attorn 
ey-general-40596-1.html. Prior to the HITECH Act, only the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services could enforce HIPAA’s privacy and security rules. See Priscilla M. Regan, Federal 
Security Breach Notifications: Politics and Approaches, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103, 1111 
n.47 (2009) (citing GINA STEVENS & EDWARD C. LIU, CONG.. RESEARCH SERV., R40546, THE 
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Congress has been considering additional data security legislation since 
at least 2005.152 Thus far in the 111th Congress, the House has passed two 
bills—the Data Accountability and Trust Act153 and the Cybersecurity 
Enhancement Act of 2010.154 This section looks at those bills, and two 
Senate bills introduced in the 111th Congress, to consider whether their 
provisions would help or hinder the deterrence and resolution of payments 
data spills. It also discusses H.R. 1319, the Informed P2P User Act, and S. 
3027, a companion bill to H.R. 1319, which was introduced in the Senate in 
February 2010. 
Each of these bills would impose new requirements on the handling of 
financial account data that is among the most valuable data for data thieves 
to access. Each bill only attempts to address a segment of a total data 
security scheme. For example, the Data Accountability and Trust Act 
directs the Federal Trade Commission to promulgate regulations to require 
owners and possessors of electronic data containing personal information 
and engaged in interstate commerce to provide for security procedures, 
vulnerability testing, and proper disposal of data, and requires notification 
of data security breaches to the FTC and to affected individuals.155 The 
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act focuses on the creation of strategic plans 
and support for research in the data security field, and requires the National 
Science Foundation to recruit for and fund a scholarship program for 
professionals in this field.156 
As a result, merchants, payments processors, and operators of payments 
systems will be subject to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999 (GLBA) and the Fair and Accurate Transactions 
Act (FACTA) requirements, and “data brokers” may be subject to new 
statutes such as the Data Accountability and Trust Act.157 Of course, 
providers of consumer financial services and products are already governed 
                                                                                                                 
PRIVACY AND SECURITY PROVISIONS FOR HEATH INFORMATION IN THE AMERICAN RECOVERY 
AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009, at 18 (2009)). 
 152. Beginning in the 109th Congress to early March 2010, numerous bills dealing with data 
security from different perspectives have been introduced in the House of Representatives. See 
generally Legislation in Current Congress, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, www.thomas.gov (last visited 
Dec. 28, 2010). Among these were Consumer Notification and Financial Data Protection Act of 
2005, H.B. 3374, 109th Cong. (2005) and the Consumer Data Security and Notification Act of 
2005, H.B. 3140, 109th Cong. (2005), from the Committees on Banking and Financial Services 
and on the Judiciary, respectively. For an excellent history of Congress’ interest in breach 
notification legislation, see Regan, supra note 151, at 1112. 
 153. Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. (as passed by House, Dec. 8, 
2009). 
 154. Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2010, H.R. 4061, 111th Cong. (as passed by House, 
Feb. 9, 2010). 
 155. H.R. 2221 §§ 2–3. 
 156. H.R. 4061 §§ 103, 106. 
 157. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999); Fair 
and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1601). 
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by Title V of the GLBA.158 S. 1490 creates enforcement mechanisms for 
violations of its own requirements,159 and it authorizes the FTC to 
promulgate regulations to implement its privacy and data security 
requirements.160 In addition, the Senate bill confirms the role of the United 
States Secret Service as the primary federal agency to be notified of data 
security breaches161 and strengthens the tools that the federal government 
may use in combating such breaches.162 It does not expand remedies for 
consumers, largely because error resolution for unauthorized transactions 
should be covered by rights available to them under laws governing other 
payments system rules including the Fair Credit Billing Act163 for credit 
card transactions or the Electronic Fund Transfer Act for debit and payroll 
card transactions.164 However, it leaves consumers affected by data spills 
affecting bank and other transaction accounts, including gift cards, without 
a specific remedy. 
1. Bills Passed by the House of Representatives 
The House of Representatives has passed two data security bills since 
the beginning of 2009. These bills are: 
a. H.R. 1319 
The House of Representatives passed H.R. 1319 on December 8, 2009; 
it requires P2P providers to disclose to users which files a P2P program can 
share and consent of the users before the files can be shared over that 
program.165 The bill also makes it unlawful for any entity covered by its 
provisions to prevent an owner or authorized user of a protected computer 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, 111th Cong. § 301 (as reported 
by S. Comm., Nov. 5, 2009) (exempting financial institutions regulated under GLBA from S. 
1490). S. 1490 also would not apply to entities governed by HIPAA. Id. (exempting HIPAA-
regulated entities from S. 1490). 
 159. Id. § 101 (“Organized criminal activity in connection with unauthorized access to 
personally identifiable information”); id. § 102 (“Concealment of security breaches involving 
sensitive personally identifiable information”); id. § 104 (“Effects of identity theft on bankruptcy 
proceedings”); id. § 202 (FTC enforcement powers against data brokers); id. § 303 (FTC 
enforcement of requirements for privacy and security of personally identifiable information 
programs); id. §§ 317–18 (enforcement by state and federal Attorney Generals of breach 
notification requirements). 
 160. Id. § 202. 
 161. Id. § 316. 
 162. Id. §§ 101–02, 202, 302, 317, 318. 
 163. Fair Credit Billing Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 301–08, 88 Stat. 1500 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 164. Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 2001, 92 Stat. 3728 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r (2006)). 
 165. Informed P2P User Act, H.R. 1319, 111th Cong. (2009). Section 2’s requirement of notice 
prior to installation or downloading of a P2P program or activation of a file-sharing function of 
such a program does not apply to pre-installed software or to software upgrades. Id. § 2(a)(2) 
(“Non-application to pre-installed software”); id. § 2(a)(3) (“Non-application to software 
upgrades”). 
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from: (1) using “reasonable efforts” to block installation of a file-sharing 
program or function if covered by the bill; and (2) “having a reasonable 
means to” disable covered file-sharing programs or removing file-sharing 
programs that the covered entity caused to be installed or induced another 
person to install.166 The bill grants authority to the FTC to enforce its 
requirements making failure of the provider to comply the equivalent of a 
violation of a rule defining unfair or deceptive acts or practices under 
§ 18(a)(1)(B) of the FTC Act.167 The bill also authorizes the FTC to 
promulgate rules to accomplish its provisions.168 
b. H.R. 2221—The Data Accountability and Trust Act 
Section 2 of the Data Accountability and Trust Act instructs the FTC to 
promulgate regulations to: 
[R]equire each person engaged in interstate commerce that owns or 
possesses data containing personal information, or contracts to have any 
third party entity maintain such data for such person, to establish and 
implement policies and procedures regarding information security 
practices for the treatment and protection of personal information taking 
into consideration— 
(A) the size of, and the nature, scope, and complexity of the 
activities engaged in by, such person; 
(B) the current state of the art in administrative, technical, and 
physical safeguards for protecting such information; and 
(C) the cost of implementing such safeguards.169 
One of the problems with H.R. 2221 is its safe harbor from liability for 
encrypted data because encryption alone170 is unlikely to sufficiently protect 
data from all hacking. Rather, it is the bundle of physical, administrative, 
and technical safeguards—which include but are not limited to encryption 
efforts—that are more likely to yield comprehensive protections. The 
incident at BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee discussed supra 
demonstrates how easily data may be stolen, particularly in large quantities, 
if more than one of the three forms of protection is not in use. 
With the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 in July 2010, it is unclear whether the 
rulemaking authority that H.R. 2221 granted to the FTC will remain there 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Id. § 2(b). 
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or will transfer to the newly created Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection.171 
c. The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2010, H.R. 4061 
On February 4, 2010, the House of Representatives passed the 
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2010. The Act, among other things, 
encourages social and behavioral research in cybersecurity,172 provides for 
sponsorship of the development of scholarship and funding for training,173 
and encourages development and promotion of international cybersecurity 
technical standards and an “identity management research and development 
program.”174 If enacted, this bill is likely to encourage, in many respects, 
new approaches to deterrence and more cooperation on spill prevention. 
2. Bills Considered by the Senate 
The Senate has considered numerous bills since January, 2009. The 
following sections consider them in detail. 
a. S. 1490—The Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 
2009 
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary found that 9,300,000 individual 
records pertaining to personal payment transactions were compromised in 
2008.175 Based on this finding, the Committee reported out S. 1490, the 
Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009. Its provisions cover 
consumer access and correction rights to information held about them by 
“data brokers.”176 Data brokers are entities that collect and sell commercial 
data, including personally identifiable information, to others, including 
governments.177 This bill resolves gaps left between the GLBA and FACTA 
safeguards and disposal rules178—and indeed by HIPAA179—because 
entities already subject to those statutes and regulations would not be 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 172. Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2010, H.R. 4061, 111th Cong. § 104 (as passed by 
House, Feb. 4, 2010). 
 173. Id. § 106 (“Federal Cyber Scholarship for Service Program”); id. § 107 (requiring an 
analysis of and recommendations for securing an “adequate, well-trained Federal cybersecurity 
workforce”). 
 174. Id. § 202 (development and promotion of “International Cybersecurity Technical 
Standards”); id. § 204 (“Identity Management Research and Development” program). 
 175. Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, 111th Cong. § 2 (as reported by 
S. Comm., Nov. 5, 2009). 
 176. Id. §§ 201–04. 
 177. Id. § 3(5) (defining “data broker”). 
 178. Disposal of Consumer Report Information and Records, 16 C.F.R. 682 (2006). This rule 
implements provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681w (2006). 
 179. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 16, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.). 
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governed by S. 1490.180 Three key features of the bill require data brokers 
who collect or maintain records pertaining to 10,000 or more individuals to: 
(1) have privacy and security programs;181 (2) audit and update those 
programs;182 and (3) notify the United States Secret Service in the event of 
data security breaches if the number of individuals whose personal 
information is obtained without authorization exceeds 10,000 or if a 
database or network containing 1 million or more individual records is 
breached.183 A separate requirement to notify individuals whose personally 
identifiable information is involved in the breach is excused if the data 
broker’s risk assessment pertaining to that breach concludes that: 
(A) there is no significant risk that a security breach has resulted in, or will 
result in, harm to the individuals whose sensitive personally identifiable 
information was subject to the security breach, with the encryption of such 
information establishing a presumption that no significant risk exists, or 
(B) there is no significant risk that a security breach has resulted in, or will 
result in, harm to the individuals whose sensitive personally identifiable 
information was subject to the security breach, with the rendering of such 
sensitive personally identifiable information indecipherable through the 
use of best practices or methods, such as redaction, access controls, or 
other such mechanisms, which are widely accepted as an effective 
industry practice, or an effective industry standard, establishing a 
presumption that no significant risk exists[.]184 
b. S. 139—The Data Breach Notification Act 
S. 139, the Data Breach Notification Act, is a narrower bill than S. 
1490. It does not impose the same requirements for new privacy and 
security programs that S. 1490 imposes and its requirements for notification 
of individuals by “data brokers” after a data breach also are narrower.185 S. 
                                                                                                                 
 180. S. 1490. 
 181. Id. § 302. 
 182. Id. § 302(e). 
 183. Id. § 316. Notice to the U.S. Secret Service by entities experiencing data security breaches 
is limited to cases in which 10,000 individual victims may be involved or to cases in which a 
database or network is involved that contains information about one million individuals or more. 
Id. 
 184. Id. § 312(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 185. S. 139’s Sections 5 and 6 use a threshold for notices required to cases involving 5,000 or 
more individuals. Data Breach Notification Act, S. 139, 111th Cong. §§ 5–6 (2009); see also id. § 
3(b)–(c) (safe harbor presumptions). However, Section 7 is similar to S. 1490 in that it requires 
notice to law enforcement only if the Serial Peripheral Interface Bus (SPI) of about 5,000 or more 
individuals is believed to have been acquired or the affected database or integrated databases 
contain SPI for one million or more individuals. See id. § 7. 
  For S. 1490, Title II’s provisions on notice to affected consumers in Sections 311 and 312 
do not contain the threshold that Sections 5 and 6 of S. 139 do. See id. §§ 311–12. Title III’s 
Section 316 contains similar threshold to S. 139’s Section 7 on notice to law enforcement—a key 
weakness in both bills. See id. § 316. However, Title III’s Section 302 contains much stronger 
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139 allows a complete defense to liability in enforcement actions brought 
for violations of its requirements if the data is encrypted or the database 
follows “best practices.”186  
c. S. 773—The Cybersecurity Act 
S. 773, the Cybersecurity Act of 2009, takes a very different approach 
from the other bills discussed in this part of the Article. It focuses on the 
development by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
of standards for federal government agencies’, government contractors’, 
and grantees’ “critical infrastructure information systems and networks.”187 
It also envisions financial assistance to create and support regional 
cybersecurity centers to assist small and medium-sized businesses.188 
Among many other provisions, it also places NIST in the position of 
representing the United States in international cybersecurity standards 
development projects,189 makes the Department of Commerce (Commerce) 
the clearinghouse for all “cybersecurity threat and vulnerability 
information,”190 and grants the Secretary access to data regardless of “any 
provision of law, regulation, rule or policy restricting such access.”191 The 
bill also authorizes the President to declare a “cybersecurity emergency” 
and to “‘order the limitation or shutdown of Internet traffic to and from any 
compromised Federal Government or United States critical infrastructure 
information system or network.’”192 
                                                                                                                 
provisions on the scope, design, assessment of and periodic reassessment of protocols designed to 
protect SPI, and also on training of personnel to protect SPI. Id. § 302. 
 186. See S. 139 § 3(b)(2)(A)(B). 
 187. Cybersecurity Act of 2009, S. 773, 111th Cong. § 6 (2009). 
 188. Id. § 5. S. 773 does not reach depositary institutions or providers of securities and 
insurance products. Jurisdiction over depositary institutions is with the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Committee Information, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON 
BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction= 
CommitteeInformation.Jurisdiction (last visited Aug. 27, 2010). 
 189. S. 773 § 6(a). 
 190. Id. § 14(a). 
 191. Id. §§ 6, 14. The breadth of this authority would allow the Secretary of Commerce to avoid 
the requirements of the Federal Right to Financial Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2006), 
and of other federal pro-privacy protections in the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
1681(u)–(v) (2006), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2006), and 
the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2006). In the absence of restrictions such as these, the 
government could obtain any information that an individual voluntarily gave to a third-party or 
that resulted from their transactions. 
 192. See S.773—Cybersecurity Act of 2009, OPENCONGRESS, http://www.opencongress.org 
/bill/111-s773/show (last visited Aug. 29, 2010) (citing S. 773 § 18(2)); see also James Corbett, 
The Rising Tide of Internet Censorship, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Feb. 5, 2010), 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=17433 (reporting, among other things, 
the finding in conjunction with the bill’s introduction in 2009 that “‘voluntary action is not 
enough’” to manage cyber security threats) (citation omitted). 
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d. S. 3027—The P2P Cyber Protection and Informed User Act 
S. 3027, the P2P Cyber Protection and Informed User Act, is a 
companion bill to H.R. 1319, which was introduced on February 23, 
2010.193 Its substance is identical to that of H.R. 1319, described in Section 
IV.A.1.a of this Article, supra.194 
B. STATE LEGISLATION 
While the federal government has been trying to enact and consider 
data security bills, at least forty-six states, and the District of Columbia, 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have enacted 
some form of data security breach notification requirements.195 One state 
has enacted a provision that requires retailers whose conduct causes 
payments data spills to compensate the parties with whom they have 
dealt,196 and a second is considering imposing a statutory contributory 
negligence standard197 as well as a fund to which merchants would 
contribute on a per-transaction basis to manage compensation for victims of 
payments data security breaches.198 
1. General Observations on State Data Security Breach Laws 
State law requirements that make vendors liable to financial institutions 
for breaches of unencrypted credit and debit card payment transaction data 
could make a big difference in the overall integrity of the payments system. 
To date, only Minnesota has enacted legislation that creates incentives to 
deter breaches in this manner.199 The Minnesota law requires the use of 
PCI,200 the only state to do so. It also imposes liability on merchants for 
data security breaches.201 The forty-five other states that have required 
breach notices to affected consumers create incentives for stronger 
                                                                                                                 
 193. P2P Cyber Protection and Informed User Act, S. 3027, 111th Cong. (as introduced, Feb. 
23, 2010). 
 194. Id.; see supra Part IV.A.1.a. 
 195. State Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13489 (last modified Apr. 12, 2010). For an excellent 
discussion of the variables in state data security laws, see G. Martin Bingisser, Note, Data Privacy 
and Breach Reporting: Compliance with Various State Laws, 4 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 9 
(2008), available at http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol4/a09Bingisser.html (written when 
about half the states had enacted data security breach notification laws). 
 196. MINN. STAT. § 325E.64 Subd. 6 (2009); MINN. STAT. § 8.31 Subd. 3 (2009). 
  197. 2010 H.B. 1149, 2010 Leg., 61st Sess. (Wash. 2010). 
 198. An earlier version of Wash. 2010 H.B. 1149 contained the authority to collect the two-cent 
fee to establish the fund. Data Security: Amended Bill Assigning Payment Card Breach Liability 
Passes Washington House, Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 94, at 429 (Mar. 2, 2010) [hereinafter 
Amended Bill Passes WA House]. 
 199. § 325E.64; see also James T. Graves, Note, Minnesota’s PCI Law: A Small Step on the 
Path to a Statutory Duty of Data Security Due Care, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1115, 1117, 
1132 (2008). 
 200. § 325E.64. 
 201. Id. Subd. 3. 
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technical, administrative, and physical safeguards for payments data by 
requiring notice to all consumers whose personally identifiable information 
has been released in a security breach.202 
But each state’s laws vary slightly, and many employ subjective or 
objective thresholds before action is required. For example, Washington’s 
statute relieves an individual or entity from the duty to disclose the breach if 
the breach “does not seem reasonably likely to subject customers to a risk of 
criminal activity.”203 Virginia’s standard is both objective and similarly 
subjective; disclosure of the breach is required if: 
[I]nformation is accessed and acquired in an unencrypted form, or if the 
security breach involves a person with access to the encryption key and 
the individual or entity [suffering the breach] reasonably believes that such 
a breach has caused or will cause identity theft or other fraud to any 
resident of the Commonwealth.204 
Reliance on the subjective assessments of the entity suffering the 
breach may be likely to produce too little notification and, therefore, too 
little customer or public pressure to reform data security practices. 
State data security breach laws often do not provide much in the way of 
direct redress for consumers whose payments transaction data is 
compromised. For example, the Indiana security breach statute does not 
create a private right of action for consumers.205 
Other state proposals use high thresholds, such as the restriction in H.B. 
1149 in Washington limiting its application to businesses and government 
agencies that process 6 million or more payment card transactions in a 
year,206 and also (perhaps incorrectly) exempts businesses or agencies from 
liability provisions if they are in compliance with PCI DSS207 (because 
compliance ends when a breach is demonstrated). The varied requirements 
of these state laws undoubtedly have contributed to the numbers of data 
security bills introduced in Congress, as interstate companies work to 
preempt with inconsistencies across states. 208 
State breach notification statutes may be seen by some as comparable to 
the outbreaks of “domestic legislation” that from time to time propelled 
                                                                                                                 
 202. See, e.g., id. Subd. 3(5). 
 203. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.255.010(d) (West 2010) (emphasis added). 
 204. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6(C) (West 2010). 
 205. Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 637 (7th Cir. 2007) (adding that the Indiana 
statute “imposes no duty to compensate affected individuals for inconvenience or potential harm 
to credit that may follow”). 
 206. See Amended Bill Passes WA House, supra note 198. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Thomas M. Lenard & Paul H. Rubin, Much Ado About Notification: Does the Rush to Pass 
State-Level Data Security Regulations Benefit Consumers?, REGULATION, Spring 2006, at 44, 49–
50, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv29n1/v29n1-5.pdf. 
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amendments to MARPOL’s requirements.209 The varying compliance 
responsibilities of separate state laws and their costs likely draw funds210 
and energy away from technical innovations aimed at overall safety goals. 
In the data security context, however, the willingness of states to enact data 
security breach laws has had the benefit of “increase[ing] the visibility” of 
data security.211 
C. NOVEL STATE PROPOSALS TO REDRESS OR DETER PAYMENTS 
DATA SECURITY BREACHES 
H.B. 1149, the bill that the Washington legislature passed,212 originally 
suggested two new means of redressing liability. First, it made vendors that 
sell payment card processing software and equipment contributorily liable 
for breaches caused by faults in their software or hardware.213 Also, it 
allowed merchants to charge two cents per transaction to offset the costs of 
the insurance merchants would have to cover their liability to financial 
institutions should data that merchants retained be breached.214 Only the 
former of these made it though Washington’s House of Representatives.215 
The bill also prohibits merchants “from retaining credit card security code 
data, PIN codes or verification numbers, or the full content of ‘magnetic 
stripe data’ after authorization of a transaction without the express consent 
of customers.”216 In addition, it makes retailers liable for breaches of 
retained payment card data if the breach affected 5,000 or more 
unencrypted individuals’ names or account numbers, as long as the business 
or agency processes 6 million or more payment card transactions per 
year.217 This provision is unique in that it limits liability to cases in which 
the breach reaches a threshold number, as opposed to the more standard 
numerical trigger for notices of the breach to consumers. If this provision is 
                                                                                                                 
 209. See, e.g., Maitland, supra note 102, at 52; Senator Lautenberg—Naval Architect?, MARINE 
LOG, Apr. 2008, at 14 (describing the October 2006 amendments to MARPOL and the notion that 
if the International Maritime Organization moves in “too ‘reasonable’ [a manner] it may not fend 
off unilateral action by individual countries”). 
 210. Caroline Stenman, The Development of the MARPOL and EU Regulations to Phase Out 
Single Hulled Oil Tankers 8, 23–24 (May 2005) (masters thesis, Goteborg University School of 
Economics and Commercial Law), available at http://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/1941/1/2005 
56.pdf (explaining how unilateral EU action spurred adoption of stricter MARPOL guidelines, 
phasing out single-hulled ships more quickly); see generally Michael E. Porter & Claas van der 
Linde, Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. OF 
ECON PERSP. 97, 113–14 (1995); Roy Rothwell, Industrial Innovation and Government 
Environmental Regulation: Some Lessons From the Past, 12 TECHNOVATION 447 (1992). 
 211. Graves, supra note 199, at 1116. 
 212. 2010 H.B. 1149, 2010 Leg., 61st Sess. (Wash. 2010), amending WASH REV. CODE § 
19.225.RCW (2010). 
 213. Id. § 3(b). 
 214. Amended Bill Passes WA House, supra note 198. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
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enacted, it could establish a precedent of non-liability for breaches affecting 
only smaller numbers of individuals, which would not create incentives for 
stronger data security. 
V. ARE “SAFE HARBORS” OR PRESUMPTIONS BASED ON 
ENCRYPTION OR OTHER SECURITY METHODS 
APPROPRIATE? 
As mentioned above, some of the data security bills pending in 
Congress provide exemptions from requirements to notify individuals 
whose personally identifiable information may have been affected by the 
data security breach if the holder of the information has had the data 
encrypted or subject to some other security methods. In some cases, 
exemptions are possible based on encryption alone. This approach is used 
in Ohio, West Virginia, and Virginia.218 In other cases, use of encryption 
alone is sufficient to establish a presumption that there is no significant risk 
that personally identifiable information was exposed in the breach.219 
Encryption alone does not prevent attacks: data in the Heartland breach was 
encrypted at the store, but apparently not in transmission.220 
In early 2010, at a lecture on encryption given by Indiana University 
School for Informatics Professor Steven A. Myers,221 I asked a question 
about basing a “safe harbor” for data security on encryption alone. The 
reaction by the Informatics faculty and graduate students in the room was 
immediate and visceral: their jaws dropped. Their ensuing remarks made it 
clear their collective belief that encryption alone should not suffice to 
qualify for a safe harbor. Rather, they preferred a combination of encryption 
                                                                                                                 
 218. Many states create safe harbors by defining personal information as unencrypted and 
readable data elements. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1347.12(A)(6)(a) (West 2010). Other 
states create safe harbors by defining a breach as “unauthorized access and acquisition of 
unencrypted and unredacted data.” W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2A-101(1) (2010). Others create 
explicit safe harbors. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6(C) (West 2010). 
An individual or entity shall disclose the breach . . . if encrypted information is 
accessed and acquired in an unencrypted form, or if the security breach involves a 
person with access to the encryption key and the individual or entity reasonably 
believes that such a breach has caused or will cause identity theft or other fraud to any 
resident of the Commonwealth. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6(C). 
 219. Several states define “significant risk” as excluding the breach of encrypted data. See, e.g., 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-3(a) (2010) (“Any state agency or person . . . shall disclose any breach 
of the security of the system which poses a significant risk of identity theft . . . to any resident of 
Rhode Island whose unencrypted personal information was [breached] . . . .”). 
 220. See Heartland Hacker Gonzalez Pleads Guilty to Compromise of Over 170 Million Cards, 
ATMMARKETPLACE.COM (Sept. 14, 2009), http://atmmarketplace.com/article.php?id=1131 
9&na=1 [hereinafter Heartland Hacker Pleads Guilty]. 
 221. Steven A. Myers, Lecture at the Maurer School of Law, Indiana University: One Bit 
Encryption (February 16, 2010). For the text of the paper on which this lecture was based, see 
Steven Myers & Abhi Shelat, Bit Encryption Is Complete (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). 
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and “best practices” involving administrative, technical, and physical 
safeguards. Dr. Meyers and others in that audience also noted that the value 
of encryption also depends to some extent on the portions of the data and 
data transmission to which encryption is applied and the manner through 
which the data were obtained. For example, the group of thieves responsible 
for the TJX and Hannaford Brothers data spills were engaged in diverse 
strategies including one known as “war driving” in which the group 
intercepted payments data during transmission over wireless Internet 
connections by positioning themselves close to store locations from which 
the data were being transmitted.222 
VI. ARE RECENT PAYMENTS DATA SECURITY 
DEVELOPMENTS MOVING CLOSER TO A MARPOL-LIKE 
REGIME? 
Data security laws in the United States normally do not mandate that a 
particular form of data security/anti-fraud process be employed, with 
Minnesota’s law as the possible vanguard of a new approach.223 Rather, 
existing state laws impose requirements on the owner of data if a data 
security breach occurs.224 Thus, the norm is to allow the marketplace to 
devise means to protect data so as to avoid the expense and reputational risk 
of revealing that a data security breach occurred. This places the 
responsibility of protecting data on each entity that holds payments data and 
related personally identifiable information. One advantage of this approach 
is that there is no single standard method of protecting payments data; the 
diversity of approaches serves as a barrier to easier hacking, and there is no 
static standard that would require legislative action to amend. However, as 
reports of the “iffy decisions” made by BP and its partners in the drilling of 
the Deepwater Horizon well show,225 self-driven risk assessments in highly 
competitive environments may result in the commitment of too few 
resources to disaster prevention.226 
Payments systems and others could create more incentives for users to 
keep up-to-date in deploying new security. They could, for instance, require 
software developers to warrant their programs (as discussed in subsection A 
below) or could push towards adoption of more secure technologies (as 
discussed in subsection B). 
                                                                                                                 
 222. Indictment at 4–5, United States v. Albert Gonzalez, No. SBK/EL/2009R00080 (D. N.J. 
2009). Gonzalez has since pled guilty to identity theft, wire fraud, computer fraud, and conspiracy 
in Massachusetts and New York, though charges are still pending in New Jersey. See Heartland 
Hacker Pleads Guilty, supra note 220. 
 223. Graves, supra note 199, at 1117. 
 224. State laws typically impose duties to disclose and/or compensate after a breach has 
occurred. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1785.11.2, 1798.29(a) (West 2007). 
 225. See Achenbach & Hilzenrath, supra note 39. 
 226. See Stephens, supra note 3. 
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A. SECURITY BASED ON SOFTWARE & WARRANTIES 
Beyond requirements for prevention of payments data spills that are 
comparable to MARPOL’s, some commentators have suggested that we 
should use different methods to make payments systems software less 
susceptible to hacking, including for example by requiring providers of 
software and database operators to warrant their products or their services 
to end users. Two of the proponents of specialty payments data warranties 
are Roland Trope227 and Professor Juliet Moringiello.228 
Warranties are a common way to manage externalities and to overcome 
asymmetries in information between manufacturers and providers of 
services and their customers.229 Warranties in sales transactions include 
express and implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a 
particular purpose, as well as warranties of good title and quiet enjoyment, 
and warranties against infringements of patents and trademarks.230 In the 
payments data security arena—as in other vertical manufacturing and 
retailing environments—warranties present some attractive market 
opportunities for providing remedies if software fail to deliver their 
promised results or services do not protect data in transmission or storage. 
In 2004, Roland Trope argued for the creation of a software “limited 
cyberworthiness warranty” based on the doctrine of seaworthiness.231 He 
made two observations that bear upon both the focus of this Article and his 
cyber-worthiness proposal. First, he explained that common law in the 
United States treats ships as “unseaworthy when [they are] ‘insufficiently or 
defectively equipped.’”232 He also observed that “[c]ourts have come to 
regard the seaworthiness of a ship as analogous to a warranty.”233 
As Mr. Trope conceives of this new limited warranty, its target is the 
capacity of a software “application’s capabilities to protect confidential 
information from unauthorized access from, or disclosure to, 
cyberspace.”234 He proposes that such a warranty might require that: 
                                                                                                                 
 227. Roland L. Trope, A Warranty of Cyberworthiness, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, Mar./Apr. 
2004, at 73 [hereinafter Cyberworthiness]. 
 228. See generally Moringiello, supra note 12. 
 229. See Claire A. Hill, A Comment on Language and Norms in Complex Business Contracting, 
77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 29, 42 (2001). 
Contractual provisions, typically representations and warranties, serve to credibly 
communicate information, chiefly to rebut the presumption of undesirable attributes 
which divergent interests inspire and information asymmetry makes possible. They 
provide a means for one party to signal to the other the absence of undesirable attributes 
and presence of desirable attributes. 
Id. 
 230. U.C.C. §§ 2-312–315 (2003). 
 231. Cyberworthiness, supra note 227, at 73–74. 
 232. Id. at 74 (citing Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724, 726 (1967)). 
 233. Id. at 74 (citing Brister v. A.W.I., Inc., 946 F.2d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1991)). 
 234. Id. at 73. 
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 Prior to the software’s release, the maker subjected [the software] 
to rigorous tests to verify its degree of security against intrusion by 
unauthorized persons, electronic agents, or code (that is, it verified 
its cyberworthiness). 
 By the time of release, the maker [should have] removed all known 
critical security vulnerabilities found in the software. (I define 
“critical” as any vulnerability that, if exploited, would enable 
unauthorized access to confidential information or unauthorized 
control of a user’s computing device.) 
 After release, the maker shall continue to diligently probe the 
software for security vulnerabilities. 
 When the maker learns of a critical vulnerability, it will 
immediately email all high-priority customers, describe the problem 
in detail, and provide suggestions for a temporary solution—
disabling features, and so on—to diminish or limit the vulnerability 
until the maker can provide a patch. (“High-priority customers” are 
those likely to have valuable confidential information at risk in 
systems linked to cyberspace. To become such a customer, the 
party would enter into a written agreement with the software maker 
that any vulnerabilities disclosed and patches released to it would 
be kept confidential to prevent hackers from gaining early 
knowledge of such vulnerabilities. These customers would pay an 
increased purchase price in exchange for the incremental increase 
in protection.) The vulnerability notice also would include 
information that would alert users to take additional precautions to 
safeguard their confidential information until they had received a 
security patch. 
 Immediately after creating a vulnerability security patch, the maker 
would email it first to the high-priority customers and, after an 
interval, to all registered software users. 
 When distributing a security patch, the software maker shall not 
attach to it any disclaimer as to the accuracy of information 
provided with the patch or its fitness for correcting the specified 
security vulnerability. . . . 
 The software’s warranty will be valid for a period of three years 
from the release date. (A security patch or newly marketed software 
should be warranted for a period comparable to that covered by the 
computing device’s warranty. It should be a period long enough to 
earn a user’s trust. . . . 
 The warranty would be valid for purchasers who buy directly from 
the maker and for those who buy from third-party sellers, but 
[whose purchaser is] still in the direct chain of distribution from the 
maker. 
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 The warranty would prescribe precautions to which purchasers 
must adhere, such as “do not open unknown attached files in emails 
from unknown senders.” Purchasers who violate the precautions 
(and suffer or cause harm) void the warranty, and will not be 
entitled to damages from the maker. 
 If the maker breaches the warranty, the purchaser (buyer or 
licensee) is entitled to an expeditious remedy of a liquidated 
damage in an amount and through a procedure specified in the 
warranty . . . .235 
Mr. Trope also proposes that this cyber-warranty be “phased in . . . with 
the first security-patch release.”236 In addition, he suggests that warrantors 
“would offer only the portion of the proposed warranty that applies to each 
patch.”237 
Professor Moringiello urges a warranty like the homeowners’ warranty 
(HOW) that first became popular in the late 1970’s.238 She analogizes to 
early warranties created by law in which courts were unwilling to allow 
injured end users no remedy as against a provider with superior knowledge 
and the ability to control the end product through contract and preventive 
measures.239 Although courts have been far more reluctant to create 
warranties in the data security arena, the theories undergirding early 
common law warranties and the original common law homeowners’ 
warranties240 may apply with equal force to payments data security. 
To allay payments-related data security concerns, the United States and 
others will need to employ both MARPOL-based approaches and 
warranties such as Trope’s phased-in cyber-worthiness warranty and 
Moringiello’s HOW-like proposals. PCI DSS—a certification process based 
on technical standards241—represents a significant advantage in protecting 
the whole electronic payments data chain, but problems nevertheless have 
arisen within systems that recently had been judged PCI DSS compliant. 
For example, Hannaford Brothers apparently met credit card industry 
security standards prior to breach but was still vulnerable to hacking.242 
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B. SECURITY BASED ON THE CARDS THEMSELVES OR ON THE CARD 
AND THE CARD AUTHENTICATION PROCESS: 
More recent payments security advances include “chip-and-PIN” 
systems associated with the Europay, MasterCard, and VISA (EMV) 
system. EMV generates transaction data from the “card authentication 
[process] and from the cardholder verification processes” the issuer may 
employ.243 Deployed in the EU, Canada, and Asia beginning in 2004, and 
mandatory in the UK beginning in 2005, chip-and-PIN technologies offer 
more protections against hacking.244 For example, in the first year of its 
deployment in the UK, chip-and-PIN technology contributed to a 13 percent 
decline in card fraud in Britain.245 However, as a “skimming” fraud246 
aimed at Shell oil stations in the UK in 2006 demonstrated, for cards that 
contain magnetic stripes as well as EMV/chip-and-PIN technology, even 
EMV is not fail-safe.247 And, as Jane Adams reports, thieves can still 
perpetrate “card-not-present” frauds by bypassing the chip or magnetic 
stripe.248 
Despite the issues with these technologies, EMV/chip-and-PIN 
technologies offer more advanced anti-fraud approaches, including the 
ability to “identify fraud patterns and credit risk situations” by comparing 
data gleaned from the current transaction to data from prior transactions.249 
However, EMV technology has been slower to gain traction in the United 
                                                                                                                 
sophisticated,’” and reporting that the hackers “mined a stream of data that merchants and banks 
were not responsible for protecting under industry rules”). 
 243. Jane Adams, Dynamic Risk Management with EMV Data, ACI WORLDWIDE, July 2006, at 
1, http://surveycenter.tsainc.com/pdfs/3065%20EMV%20flyer.pdf (citing Michael Hendry, a 
payments consultant who helped implement EMV systems in the EU). 
 244. See, e.g., Fed Official Warns Card Fraud Threat Growing in U.S., COLLECTIONS & 
CREDIT RISK (July 27, 2010), http://www.collectionscreditrisk.com/news/fed-official-warns-card-
fraud-threat-growing-3002682-1.html (citing Richard Oliver of the Atlanta Federal Reserve 
Bank’s Retail Payments Risk forum advocating for shift to EMV smart-card technology to thwart 
fraud rings and criminals used in Europe, Canada, and other regions of the world); Fitzgerald, 
supra note 41 (describing phase-in deadlines for EMV technology in Canada and liability 
increases for merchants that have not deployed it on schedule); Brian Ooi, The EMV Migration 
Path in the Asia Pacific Region, FROST & SULLIVAN (Aug. 25, 2005), http://www.frost.com/prod/ 
servlet/market-insight-top.pag?docid=46281303; Vijayan, supra note 80. 
 245. Adams, supra note 243, at 1. 
 246. See Petrol Station Worker Admits Credit Card Fraud, NORTHAMPTON CHRON. & ECHO 
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States250 than in Europe251 and the absence of EMV chips is an obstacle to 
U.S.-based consumers using their cards for international travel.252 Among 
the issues that may work against broader-scale deployment in the U.S. are 
the costs of the readers253 for EMV cards and concerns that full-deployment 
of the cards featured could implicate privacy concerns.254 
CONCLUSION 
The cost and extent of payments-related data security breaches have 
been rising in the United States.255 Legislation to curb data security 
breaches and to enhance enforcement of federal laws that have emanated 
recently from the Committee on the Judiciary in the House of 
Representatives and the Senate Committees on the Judiciary, Homeland 
Security, and Commerce, Science and Technology offer promise. These 
bills are steps in the right direction but they still suffer from the 
jurisdictional limitations under which the Senate Committees in particular 
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operate.256 These jurisdictional limitations caused the current gaps in data 
security left by GLBA,257 FACTA,258 and HIPAA.259 Thus, the more recent 
bills described in this paper—apart from S. 773—focus on “data brokers,” 
commercial entities whose primary role is to collect and sell post-
transaction information including personally identifiable information, as 
opposed to persons who themselves engaged in transactions with consumers 
whose personal and account information is the target of thieves or those 
already are governed as “consumer reporting agencies” by the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act and FACTA.260 
These bills will impose on data brokers particular federal requirements, 
but will leave them unconnected legally to end users, that is, the consumers 
or businesses whose transaction information they have obtained will still be 
without legal recourse against the entity that was holding their data at the 
time of the breach.261 For this reason, the lack of a unified regulatory regime 
operating on an end-to-end basis leaves the door open to future database 
hacking because of decisions such as that by the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts in Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, 
Inc.262 Moreover, Congressional bills, such as H.R. 2221 and S. 1490, 
which grant a safe harbor from prosecution for violations of their 
requirements, including the requirement to notify affected individuals if the 
data are encrypted or the entity uses other “best practices” to bolster the 
benefits of encryption, are likely to leave a lot of account data and other 
personally identifiable information without sufficient protection.263 
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The current enacted and proposed legislation addresses many of the 
similarities between data spills and maritime accidents. But, unfortunately, 
many of our data security efforts to date seem to miss the most critical 
distinction between legal schemes for the prevention of pollution from 
maritime accidents and other legal prevention schemes: that payments-
related data security breaches are different from the hazards of maritime 
activities. It is important to remember Roland Trope’s highly useful 
observation that it is easier for ships to avoid encounters with charted rocks 
and shallow waters than with shifting sand bars.264 The former do not move. 
Sand bars move, and their movement may be accelerated by storms and 
other weather conditions. But even sand bars are better known risks than 
data-security attacks. Sand bars and other natural maritime risks move 
much less frequently and normally with more predictability than does the 
capacity, indeed the determination and artistry, of individuals determined to 
penetrate databases or to intercept real-time exchanges of payments-related 
data. 
Maritime accidents fall into two categories—collisions between two 
ships, or accidents involving the oil-and-gas exploration or the operation of 
deepwater ports, which are primarily the result of operator negligence, on 
the one hand, and groundings or collisions with rocks, sand bars and shoals, 
and other inherent sea hazards.265 Payments data security breaches seem 
more closely associated with the former category because cost-cutting and 
inadequate risk assessments by private actors contribute to disasters with 
broad-reaching implications, as the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill 
tragically demonstrated.266 But payments-related data spills are even harder 
to prevent because, unlike events caused by storms, negligence, or merely 
bad choices, data security breaches are perpetrated by determined 
individuals who are constantly exploring new methods of getting access to 
data and systems they need to engage in crimes. Thus, in payments-data 
security, the “terrain”-based threats seem to be subject to even more 
constant changes than are sand bar risks to maritime activities. 
Like MARPOL and the associated compensation conventions—such as 
Civil Liability 1992 and Fund 1992, and their predecessors267—we should 
make data protection a dynamic process that receives persistent attention, 
specifically by rethinking and restructuring it as new means of safeguarding 
against data protection penetration as administrative, technical, and physical 
safeguards come into being. Encryption is one of the technical safeguards 
                                                                                                                 
 264. Interview with Roland Trope, supra note 147. 
 265. See supra text accompanying notes 139–146; see also Graham Mapplebeck, Int’l Mar. 
Org., Navigational Safety and the Challenges of Electronic Navigation (Feb. 14, 2008) (transcript 
available at https://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D21091/Navigation 
alsafety.pdf). 
 266. See Achenbach & Hilzenrath, supra note 39. 
 267. See supra text accompanying notes 98–133. 
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that should be part of this process, but it alone is insufficient to protect data, 
counter-parties, or consumers. 
Moreover, despite traditional and appropriate reluctance in this country 
to require that certain technologies be employed, developments elsewhere 
may make the use of specific technologies, comparable to the double-hull 
requirement in MARPOL,268 mandatory. For example, with EMV 
increasingly in use in the EU and Canada, it may only be a matter of time 
before EMV is more widely used here by credit and debit card issuers. 
However, while EMV technologies can contribute to greater fraud 
prevention, they do not yield 100% protection from fraud269—and their 
protection may come at the price of consumer/user privacy.270 
Third, despite the widespread damage that a maritime accident may 
create, the causes and effects of data spills are much less localized than the 
effects of typical maritime accidents. Data security breaches of a system in 
one part of the world—such as the penetration of Royal Bank of Scotland’s 
WorldPay system and the rapid subsequent withdrawals at ATMs in forty-
nine countries271—affect payments systems in other parts of the world.272 
Fourth, Congress and the states have crafted legislation that addresses 
consumer concerns more than actual prevention of payments data spills. 
With the exception of S. 773, the other bills discussed in this Article require 
consumer notification once the spill has occurred if the owners’ 
assessments of the number of consumers affected exceed specified 
thresholds and also address certain limited law enforcement concerns.273 
But they generally leave risk-assessment and choices of administrative, 
technical, and physical safeguards for systems and data to the private actors 
involved. 
Consumers in a breach-prone environment are a lot like birds, fish, and 
other animals whose habitats are affected by spills of hazardous substances 
they did not cause. They often lack the ability to protect themselves. 
However, in the data security environment, consumers with access to 
information concerning data spill events may be better able to thwart 
additional damages to their financial well-being such as identity theft and 
credit-rating damage. However, at this time in the United States, as 
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described in this Article, there is no standard requirement for disclosure, 
and in some states disclosure is limited to large-scale data spills, such as the 
6-million-payments-card processed-per-year threshold in Washington 
State’s H. 1149.274 Even consumers who might consider switching to new 
providers or to other retailers after a data-spill event affected their former 
provider or favorite grocery chain, there are few guarantees that the security 
systems that their new providers employ are any less vulnerable to a breach 
than their former providers’ systems were. 
Similarly, some data spills cause other providers’ systems to become 
infected, in a manner like Deep Water Horizon or the Exxon Valdez in 
which oil spread away from the primary location.275 Accordingly, entities 
that own or possess payments data should receive legal or other financial 
incentives to employ ever-strengthening administrative, technical, and 
physical protections for data related to consumer deposit accounts, credit 
cards, debit cards, and other prepaid cards, as well as for other types of 
financial accounts such as insurance and securities. And there should be 
adequate legal consequences of failing these duties to maintain adequate 
safeguards beyond those already codified such as the rules implementing 
GLBA, FACTA, and other federal statutes and rules, including appropriate 
private rights of action provided by relevant federal statutes or fines as the 
OPA allows.276 
As EMV/chip-and-PIN technologies deploy around us,277 they probably 
will become the standards for retail payments security. EMV and PCI DSS 
are different solutions to these issues, employed in different nations, to 
protect the integrity of card-based payments. EMV and PCI DSS represent 
different philosophies for providing protection on the order of MARPOL’s 
double-hulled ship scheme. However, employing some security technology 
such as EMV imposes a real trade off in the form of privacy, because the 
technology can retain more information about purchasing habits than other 
card systems retain on the card itself.278 This does not present the same 
types of concerns in Canada or the EU as it may in the U.S. because of the 
restrictions on trading the types of information that EMV technologies and 
other payment card transactional records may contain. This concern would 
grow larger if legislation such as S. 773 is enacted because it grants open-
ended access to information to the Secretary of Commerce, without mention 
of any restrictions on retention or other use of the information unconnected 
with prosecution and resolution of the data security breach.279 Thus, it could 
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enable a vast warehousing of payments transaction data by Commerce 
without protections already applicable to other government data requests or 
collection.280 
Among the solutions discussed in this Article, the types of cyber 
warranties that Mr. Trope and Professor Moringiello have advocated are 
attractive so long as they cannot be disclaimed, depriving end users and 
consumers of their protections. New data security warranties could be 
enacted at the state level, or by Congress, or could form part of a 
MARPOL-like multilateral approach with its prescriptive regulation of 
aspects of accident prevention and intentional shipping discharges of oil 
and other pollutants—such as its double-hull and operational requirements, 
as well as its additional operational requirements or “penalties” on ships 
that do not comply.281 MARPOL’s requirement of notice of spills and 
discharges to a central agency is similar to proposals in Congress that 
require notice to the U.S. Secret Service.282 Notice allows a government 
authority to monitor recovery processes and to coordinate law enforcement 
resources as needed. 
However, in terms of compensation for victims of shipping spills and 
discharges and oil-and-gas exploration accidents, neither MARPOL nor the 
Oil Liability provisions of the Clean Water Act offers optimal solutions for 
the payments data security breach arena for at least two reasons. First, 
unlike shipping or exploration events that are unlikely to repeat themselves, 
payments data breaches may recur or thieves may use and/or resell the 
information they obtain. Second, once liability limits are enacted in statutes 
or agreed to in treaties or conventions, they are difficult to raise.283 
Enabling stronger deterrence of, and finding means of resolving 
payments data security breaches when they occur, is vitally important to the 
integrity of the payments system and to individuals’ trust of it. We should 
strive for more seamless recovery methods than are currently available in 
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the U.S., through regulatory or private litigation.284 The movement from a 
private claims process conducted by BP for persons whose employment 
was adversely affected as a result of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill to a 
federal claims czar overseeing the claims—such as Kenneth Feinberg’s 
Deepwater Horizon and 9/11 Claims processes285—suggests a model for 
claims resolution outside the court system at the election of the claimant.286 
Such claims processes are particularly important in cases in which there 
may be thousands of similarly situated claimants as well as those cases in 
which the claimant is unlikely to be able to access the technical expertise 
necessary to pursue his claims apart from the option of class actions. A 
rigorous claims procedure also would protect the entity experiencing the 
breach in the same manner that the alleged tortfeasor is protected by the 
“economic loss doctrine” barring recovery to claimants that cannot 
demonstrate actual damages.287 
Payments data security is increasingly vital to the economy and to 
national security. After the 2010 Cyber Shock Wave simulation,288 the 
former director of the National Security Agency during the Clinton 
Administration argued that the government needs more capacity to deal 
with cyber security events and strategies as well as the ability to work 
cooperatively with the private sector.289 Only two of the federal bills 
analyzed in this Article—H.R. 2221 and S. 773—address strategic 
payments and non-payments security issues, such as malicious and strategic 
cyber attacks on infrastructure in the payments, utilities, and 
telecommunications areas in the U.S. This is accomplished through their 
grants of authority to order sequestration of systems that are compromised 
or that threaten other systems and infrastructures.290 We also may need to 
impose stronger requirements on companies who have had more than one 
data security breach, such as ChoicePoint. And, finally, we can hope that 
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multilateral organizations in the payments industry can play a stronger role 
than they have so far in framing for payments data protection functional 
equivalents of MARPOL’s double-hulled vessels and other operational 
restrictions. 
With the growing evidence of the cross-border implications of data 
spills, we would also do well to consider the benefits of international 
cooperation—recognizing, as Melissa Hathaway, former acting senior 
director for cyberspace for the National Security and Homeland Security 
Councils did, that the U.S. “‘cannot succeed in securing cyberspace if it 
works in isolation.’”291 
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